Reasoning About Belief Revision

  • Caroline Semmling
  • Heinrich Wansing
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 21)


The theory of belief revision developed by Carlos Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors and David Makinson (AGM) is one of the most influential and well-investigated theories of rational belief change; for a comprehensive presentation and references see Hansson (1999) and Rott (2001). This highly successful research program co-exists with another major research program concerned with the belief and knowledge of rational agents, namely doxastic and epistemic logic. With respect to epistemic logic, in Knowledge in Flux (1988), Peter Gärdenfors remarked:


Object Language Proof System Belief Revision Epistemic Logic Belief Change 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of PhilosophyDresden University of TechnologyDresdenGermany

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