Abstract
Structural realism comes in various shapes and sizes. First there is the epistemic kind which holds that at best we can have knowledge of the structure of the world. This comes in two main flavours: à la Ramsey (e.g. John Worrall and Elie Zahar 2001) claiming that the structure of the world is reflected in the Ramsey sentence of successful scientific theories and à la Russell (e.g. Ioannis Votsis 2005) claiming that we can infer certain things about the structure of the world from the structure of our perceptions. Then there is the ontic kind which also comes in a multitude of flavours, three of which stand out: (i) the ‘no objects view’ (e.g. James Ladyman 1998) according to which there exist no objects only structures, (ii) the ‘no individuals view’ (e.g. Steven French and Decio Krause 2006) which maintains that there exist no individuals but only structures and objects lacking individuality and (iii) the ‘no intrinsic natures view’ (e.g. Ladyman 2007) which eliminates intrinsic natures in favour of haecceity-free individuals and structures.
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Notes
- 1.
Concerning the ‘no objects view’, Ladyman insists (in private communication) he never intended to say that no objects exist. He admits, however, that certain of his early pronouncements have contributed to this misinterpretation.
- 2.
In a recent workshop on structural realism organised in Banff by Elaine Landry, Ladyman urged the participants, who parenthetically represented almost the whole spectrum of different structural realist positions and included most of the main players, to find a mutually agreeable formulation of what is common to all. What became clear by the end of the workshop was that no such formulation can easily be produced.
- 3.
The structural continuity claim is not the sole motivation for Poincaré’s epistemic structural realism as I indicate in Votsis (2004, ch. 2).
- 4.
I have defended a version of the structure vs. non-structure distinction in Votsis (2007).
- 5.
It is atypical but not unique. Several structures postulated within the framework of the caloric theory of heat have survived the theory’s demise and are still with us today, e.g., Sadi Carnot’s principle of maximum efficiency.
- 6.
Though not a structural realist, Robert Batterman (2002, pp. 17–19) draws a similar distinction between reduction (where the limit is regular) and intertheoretic relations (where it is singular).
- 7.
It may still be possible that two structures are somehow partially continuous on the basis of non-defining features. I mention this only as food for thought as I do not really put much trust in the claim that continuity of this kind is sufficient for (structural) realist purposes.
- 8.
For a similar point see also Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1993, p. 261).
- 9.
It is worth noting that we currently have evidence for the orbits of only around a dozen exoplanets.
- 10.
We only have a tentative account in the guise of the nebular hypothesis which provides sketches of the formation and evolution of solar systems.
- 11.
Radder (in e-mail communication) points out that this idea spells the end of convergent realism. Although strictly speaking correct, this does not mean that we slip back into anti-realism. After all, what I say here, i.e. that predictively and explanatorily successful theory parts still survive theory change, is consistent with realism. Moreover, not always having full convergence towards one or more successor theories does not mean having no convergence whatsoever. Remember, in the case at hand, Poiseuille’s law is the exception, not the rule!
- 12.
That the third premise amounts to preservation being a necessary condition of an element’s (approximate) truth is more clearly seen when formulated in its contrapositive form, i.e. the (approximate) truth of an element implies its preservation.
- 13.
This last scenario finds support in some interpretations of the measurement problem in quantum mechanics.
- 14.
Under the current qualification, isolated incidents of narrowly construed Kuhn losses are not sufficient to undermine the structural continuity claim.
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Acknowledgements
My sincerest thanks to Hans Radder who has provided helpful feedback. This work was in part made possible by funding from the German Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).
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Votsis, I. (2010). Structural Realism: Continuity and Its Limits. In: Bokulich, A., Bokulich, P. (eds) Scientific Structuralism. Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, vol 281. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9597-8_6
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