Abstract
Contrary to a generally accepted idea, the legal use of topics within the framework of late scholastic, did not have as a function to introduce indecisiveness or relativism into the treatment of particular cases. On the contrary, its function was to obtain unquestionable conclusions, based on the logical properties of a classification of genus and species, it constituted deductively, inductively and analogically by the examination of substantive law and ratio legis.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
Archives de Philosophie du Droit, t.XVII (1979), ‘L’interprétation’, p. 72–88.
- 2.
Op. cit. p. 86.
- 3.
Op. cit. p. 88: “Ensuite, dans la scolastique décadente, la déduction syllogistique unilatérale l’emporte sur l’art polyphonique de la discussion; les Analytiques d’Aristote, sur sa Rhétorique et sur ses Topiques; la méthode encore dialectique des postglossateurs (mos italicus) se voit bientôt contestée par les humanistes... ”
- 4.
Op cit. p. 82. Idem p. 83: “Les sentences des juristes consultés (sententiae et opiniones), étant le fruit d’un travail de dialecticien, sortes d’opinions seulement plausibles, ne sont elles-mêmes que des opinions.”
- 5.
Op. cit. p. 83: “... le Digeste n’est qu’un catalogue de topoi, d’opinions fragiles... Il faut bien qu’il en soit ainsi si la méthode est dialectique...”
- 6.
Op. cit. p. 84: “On y voit les postglossateurs, ces successeurs authentiques des jurisconsultes, user selon les circonstances parfois du texte des statuts écrits des communes, des textes romains ou coutumiers, ou bien des lieux en sens divers que fournissent la philosophie et la littérature commune comme l’équité, le droit naturel ou l’utilité...”
- 7.
Op. cit. p. 84–85: “Il ne s’agissait pas d’une suite déductive de normes, mais d’un classement des genres de cas ou parfois des types de sources, ou des topoi, des arguments applicables à chaque problème.”
- 8.
Op. cit. p. 87: “…ainsi nous autres sur le monde, les rapports justes dans le monde, n’avons jamais que des points de vue d’où naissent les topoi, les opinions particulières, point de départ de la dialectique.” The standpoints would only be in fact the preliminary material of the topoi (themselves assimilated to particular opinions), if M. Villey did not add then quoting Viehweg (Topik und jurisprudenz. München. 1953) “les topoi sont des points de vue”.
- 9.
Op. cit. p. 84: “Le droit du Moyen Âge non plus n’est pas un ni plusieurs systèmes mais une incessante dialectique entre sources hétérogènes; d’où sa grande fécondité...”
- 10.
Op. cit. p. 85: “Le droit à Rome ne possède pas de forme achevée; il n’a pas d’existence actuelle; il n’est qu’en puissance. Il est une recherche, un art; disposant..., d’un lot disparate d’instruments (de règles, de topoi)...”
- 11.
Op. cit. p. 83: “...Il apparaît que le jus civile Romain n’est pas fait de règles certaines et nécessairement consolantes … Nées de la dialectique elles demeurent dans la dialectique; elle sont encore soumises au feu de la discussion dialectique. Et rien n’empêche qu’elles ne discordent: on peut alléguer contre Labeon l’opinion de Sabinus...”
- 12.
Op. cit. p. 83: “Les sentences des jurisconsultes étant le fruit d’un travail de dialecticien, sortes d’opinions seulement plausibles, ne sont elles-mêmes que des opinions. On doit sans doute leur reconnaître une autorité supérieure, à cause du prestige de leurs auteurs et du long travail de recherche dont elles ont été le résultat., cette autorité cependant demeure relative.” Idem p. 87: “Et, comme il est de l’essence de la dialectique de ne pouvoir jamais accéder à des solutions démontrées, il faut qu’au terme de sa recherche, ayant pesé le pour et le contre, le jurisconsulte prononce sa sentence autoritairement…La dialectique ne conclut que grâce à l’intervention d’un maître.”
- 13.
Op. cit. p. 88.
- 14.
Op. cit. p. 85.
- 15.
Theodor Viehweg. Topik und Jurisprudenz. Mûnchen (1953), (the Italian translation which is used here, has been published under the title Topica e Giurisprudenza. Giuffrè editore, 1962. Milano). Indeed, we find in this book he same judgment on the “unilateral syllogistic deduction” principle (“..sembra esistere un nesso, che non consente di esser ridotto, semplificato in un nesso logico, sicché noi veniamo ad occuparci soltanto, in definitiva, di costruzioni che sono ancora isolate ed indifferenti.” p. 40), the concomitant valorization of a pluralist and no-verifonctional approach of the diversity of practical cases (“...le premesse vengono qualificate come ‘rilevanti’ o ‘irrilevanti’, ‘accettabili’ o ‘inaccettabili’, ‘da condividere’ o ‘da non condividere’, ‘sostenibili’ o ‘non sostenibili’ e così via e che anche delle posizioni intermedie, come ‘appena sostenibile’, ‘ancora sostenibile’, p. 43–44), and the assertion of the antinomy between deductive logic and the art of topic (“la topica presuppone la mancanza di un sistema di tal genere... Se tuttavia si riesce a costruire un sistema deduttivo, verso il quale ogni scienza, considerata dal punto di vista della logica, deve tendere, la topica viene in larga misura abbandonata.” p. 45).
- 16.
Op. cit. p. 84: “Il suo lavoro, già piừ volte citato, De methodo ac ratione studendi libri tres, non costituisce un fatto particolare, ma si pone accanto ad altri lavori consimili.” (with the following note added for the term ‘consimili’: “Si tratta della cosiddetta letteratura topica. Ề vero che essa si ha nell’età dell’Umanesimo (per es. Gammarus, 1507, Everhard, 1516; Cantiuncula, 1520; Apel, 1533; Oldendorf, 1545), ma contiene in larga misura spirito medioevale.”
- 17.
Bobbio N and Bovero M (2002). El caracter del Iusnaturalismo, in Sociedad y estado en la filosofia moderna (article diffused on Internet by http://www.sociologia.de.
- 18.
Op. cit.: “Como el lector entendió, me refiero a la obra de Ch. Perelman tan vasta que no puede ser exhaustivamente presentada en una nota ... No debe olvidarse en la misma dirección el libro de Th. Viehweg, Topik und Jurisprudenz ... que si bien partiendo de supuestos diferentes llega a resultados similares.”
- 19.
Op. cit.: “Con el avance de la ‘escuela’ van desapareciendo los tópicos y las dialécticas, todas las ‘regulae docendi et discendi’, que se refieren a la lógica de lo probable. El redescubrimiento de la retórica como técnica del discurso persuasivo, opuesta a la lógica como técnica del discurso demostrativo, y el reconocimiento de que las operaciones intelectuales efectuadas por los juristas en su función de intérpretes pertenecen a la primera, puede servir para explicar el carácter específico del iusnaturalismo, con una claridad de la que en general no hay huella en la historia de la escuela. Si bien con una cierta simplificación, es válido sostener que el iusnaturalismo fue la primera (y también la última) tentativa de romper el nexo entre el estudio del derecho y la retórica como teoría de la argumentación, y de abrirlo a las reglas de la demostración.”
- 20.
See the preamble of the Loci argumentorum legales (p.8 of the edition of Francfort, 1591) where Everhardus declares: “The pieces of writing on ‘loci legales’ are not only useful for students in law, but mostly necessary (and it’s on this subject that wrote Balde in his comment of C.1.3.15, the Speculator [Guillaume Durand] in his ‘De disputationibus et adlegationibus’, Alberic de Rosate in his ‘Dictionarium juris tam Civilis quam Canonici’ and Arnold of Rotterdam in his ‘Tractatus de Dialecticis graecorum principalibus’. But Ciceron spoke of that more exactly in his Topics, and after him, Boece, Quintilien in his book ‘Institutiones oratoriae’, and Rodolphe Agricola in his book ‘De inventione Dialectica libri tres’. See also the §. ‘Divisio locorum’ of the Topica Legalia where Cantiuncula says “Others have differently classified the loci and difficulty agree between them. Thus, Rodolphus Agricola, which follows the opinion of le Great Erasme, is in disagreement with Aristote, Ciceron and Boèce… But Ph. Melanchton differently deals with topics in his pieces of writings on rhetoric… and a long time before that, lawyers like Alberic of Rosate, the Speculator, Balde and some others, have put together a great number of arguments from the interpretation of laws.”
- 21.
The classification of authors quoted in the Dialectica legalis of Gammarus, according to their frequency of call, gives: Bartole, Balde, Aristote, Abbas Panormitanus, Dynus Mugellanus, Johannes Andreae, Boece, Jason of Mayno, Imola, Butrio, Paul of Castro, Gambilionibus, Geminianus, Pistoriensis and various postglossators incidentally used. Quite the same classification would be obtained from the Loci argumentorum legales of Everhardus, with the three following specificities: the number of references to postglossators works is considerable there; the quotations of Balde are more frequent than those of Bartole; and the references to the topics of Aristote are negligible, owing to the more ‘casuisitic’ character of the Everhardus processes. On the other hand, the classification of the authors quoted in the Topica legalia of Cantiuncula reveals his membership of legal humanism since we obtain: Cicero, Zasius, Alciat, Agricola and Boece, to which Bartole, who is practically the only one representative of the mos italicus, finally succeeds.
- 22.
Loci argumentorum legales, Francfort (edition of 1591).
- 23.
Petri Andreae Gammari Bononiensis Dialecticae legalis sive topicorum libri III (edition of 1522).
- 24.
The Topica legalia which was consulted, follows the Methodica dialectice ratio ad jurisprudentiam adcommodata in the edition of Bâle (edition of 1545).
- 25.
Synopsis locorum legalium, Darmstadt (edition of 1610).
- 26.
Centum modi argumentandi, Venise (edition of 1539).
- 27.
(1)According to the arguments can be obtained by deduction, induction or analogy; (2) according to they can be necessary and provable, only necessary, only provable; (3) according to they can be obtained by syllogism, induction, enthymem or by one example. (op. cit. p. 8).
- 28.
Gammarus, op. cit. p. 10.
- 29.
The comprehension of the relationships between logic and norms in the use of topics is no more ensured when Th. Viehweg uses the words ‘cliché’ and ‘standpoint’, to join together and confuse in the same category, contents as different as legal topics, ‘literary topic’ and ‘musical topics’ (p.38). Because the indisputable fact that the word Topica was used in a generic way to indicate as well “rules” of reasoning as criteria of empirical classification (cf. the ‘medical Topics’), or of taste, doesn’t imply the argumentative identity of these various collections.
- 30.
Everhardus, Loci argumentorum legales, ‘Preambula’, §.7: “We must know that it is easy to solve all legal difficulties if we pay attention to what contain the following terms: the cause, the place, the time, the person... Because law changes if they are added... See also what Odofredus and Balde say in their ‘Proemium’ of the Digeste, when they skilfully teach us that the force of any misleading argument can be invalidate in three ways: by the consideration of modalities, people and relations...”.
- 31.
Everhardus, op. cit. §. 1: “We call places [locos], some positions [sedes] immediately available, by which we build necessary or probable arguments, about matter of points which it is necessary to confirm or invalidate”… “An argument consists of all this which give a conviction [fidem facere], in whatever way, about a doubtful thing we discuss.” … “It’s arguing and disputing that we find the truth.” We must finally underline that Everhardus quotes only one very ‘dubious locus’: “a tractatu sive perplexis aut implicitis”, and that his argumentation aims to remove this uncertainty by analyzing the implicit one.
- 32.
Op. cit. §. 7: “We know by argument what we cannot notice in an obvious way.”
- 33.
Op. cit. §.14: “What somebody tell be true according to law,, he must prove it by putting forward an express text or by leading to a text thanks to an argument using one of the legal loci… Whe argue in law, in three different ways, namely: by law, by reason, and by one example… We argue thanks to the reason, when an express law is missing, but however natural reason imposes something… And here Balde says in his comment of D.27.1 that we don’t be astonished to see the reason receiving such a force, since reason is the soul of law and that it represents a kind of inner tacit law in the spirit of men, and his text says that reason, truth and God are equivalent… But we argue by an example when we proceed from a particular case to an other, owing to something similar we recognize in them. And there is not any way of argumentation which cannot be reduce to one of these three modes.”
- 34.
Op. cit. §. 13: “The jurisconsult looks after what is just and unjust”; §. 16: “The reason is quite a tacit law which is inscribe in the spirit of men”; §. 17: “In discussions, it’s necessary to finally refer to the most valid and most constraining argument.”
- 35.
Op. cit. §. 16: “The reason is a kind of tacit law inscribed in the mind of men.”
- 36.
Op. cit. §. 27: “Who studies law must be humble, and must not foresee to be able to judge according to the law if he did not examine the totality of laws, since the terms which follow sometimes clarify or sometimes depart from those which precede.”
- 37.
Gammarus, De veritate ac excellentia legalis scientiae libellus, pp. 160–161: “In his book De republica, Ciceron elegantly spoke about it in this way: the true law is the right reason, congruent with nature, present in everybody, eternal and constant... And there will not be a law for Rome, an other for Athens, an other now, an other afterwards, but only one eternal law for all and in any time... The law is the highest reason inscribe in nature, which orders the acts having to be done and prohibits the others.”
- 38.
De ratione studii legalis paraenesis, Bâle (1522).
- 39.
Cantiuncula, Topica legalia, pp. 28–30.
- 40.
Op. cit. p. 28.
- 41.
Op. cit. p. 30.
- 42.
Op. cit. p. 29: “The argument proceeding from the parts to the integral whole is valid in an affirmative way when we consider the shape of the thing as an integral part of this thing. Indeed, since this part exists and disappears at the same time as the whole (as we will teach it in the place “a forma”), we can reason in an affirmative and negative way from a part of this type.”
- 43.
Op. cit. p. 29: “There is indeed parts... which take the name of the whole only when they are joined together. Thus, since the foundations, the walls and the roof constitute a house, they form a house when they are joined together. But alone, the foundations cannot be named by the name of house... It’s not the same in the case of species whose all receive the whole name of the genus, like when man and horse receive the name of animal.”
- 44.
Op. cit. p. 29: “In the enumeration of the parts which do not receive the name of the whole, unless being all joined together, we will follow the Boece’s doctrines in the following rules. If we want to destroy an argument, it will be enough to find one missing element. If we want to confirm it, it will be necessary to find them all joined together.”
- 45.
Op. cit. p. 30: “But [this invalidity] is not accepted in three different cases. Firstly, if we speak about a discontinuous quantity, such as a promised or bequeathed species. As when we indicate this money which is in this coffer. Indeed, if this money is destroyed, we can infer that no discontinuous quantity is due, since the promisor is released by the destruction of the species, when there is neither fault nor fraud from him.”
- 46.
Op. cit. p. 30: “Secondly, if the statement turn on a matter which give the same substance to the part and the whole, like when we say: an action in rem is in conformity with law, so any action is in conformity with law. And it’s the same thing when we reason in a negative way, like when we say: the action ‘ex empto’ comes from a contract and is not an action in rem, so, no action coming from a contract is an action in rem.”
- 47.
Op. cit. p. 30: “Thirdly, each time that we reasons starting from all the parts joined together at the same time, to go towards the whole, as we will underline it in the locus ‘a specie’. We argue then affirmatively proceeding from a part so conceived, towards the whole, as follows: somebody has the intention of a good faith owner, thus he possesses in good faith. When we argue negatively, we do not create any right.”
- 48.
These rules are stated in the topic a specie ad genus as: “De quocunque dicitur species, de eodem dicitur genus”; “Si in hac universali quaelibet singularis non est vera, tota oratio reditur falsa.”
- 49.
Indeed, Everhardus distributes the properties of the topic a partibus, in two relatively minor topics: ab enumeratione partium and a minori, and in the basic topic: a ratione legis larga ampla seu generali ad extensionem ipsius legis (to which he devotes the pages 481 to 540 of his Loci argumentorum legales), distinguishing the argumentation rules according to whether they apply to cases rectifying a previous law (casus est correctorium), derogating from common law (casus est exorbitantium a jure communi ac regulari), coming under criminal law (casus est poenalium, ubi locum habet extensio), or simply expending this law (casus est de extensione, in non correctoriis, nec exorbitantibus, nec poenalibus).
- 50.
We find it especially in the §. 3 of the topic ab opinione vulgi of Everhardus’s Loci argumentorum legales. (p. 113).
- 51.
Cf. the disputable feature of the mixture of categorization criteria proposed by Cantiuncula in the case of the topic a partibus (according to the nature of the parts and the way of reasoning that we apply to them).
- 52.
For this reason, the Topics are both argumentation treaties and interpretation treaties whose target is to constitute a grammar of laws. This find expression in the presence of ‘necessaries’ topics like a definitione, ab etymologia, ab allusione vocabuli, etc, and the frequent compiling of works mixing logical, grammar and law (cf the opuscule Particularis juris of the Leibniz’s uncle, J. Strauch).
- 53.
This number is obtained by counting for only one genus of topic the various species of the topic a simili.
- 54.
We could perhaps reproach him to have confused necessity and obligation. However his interpretation is justify by the fact that all topics are naturally obligatory since the laws of which they summarize the way of reasoning (including those which derogate from the rule), have this character by definition.
- 55.
That is the definiens and the definiendum in a definitione, the demonstrans and the demonstrandum in a descriptione, the sum of the parts of a thing and the thing itself in ab enumeratione partium, the single species of a genus and this genus in a specie ad genus.
- 56.
Cf. the topic a defectu formae where the no-respect of legal procedures implies the nullity of the act, and those in which there is inclusion of the second in the first (like the species in the genus in a genere ad speciem).
- 57.
Op. cit. pp. 43–44.
- 58.
Op. cit pp. 120–131.
- 59.
The ‘Assimilation’, i.e. the analogical extension about which speaks D.9.1.4, is that by which the ‘actio noxalis’ defined by the ‘Leges XII tabularum’ and that we can exert against the owner of a quadruped which caused a damage, is extended to any animal. (“And this action can be usefully brought if it’s not a quadruped but an other animal which caused the damage”).
- 60.
p.95 of the Synopsis and pp. 637–655 of the Loci argumentorum legales.
- 61.
p.10 of the Synopsis and pp. 86–92 of the Loci argumentorum legales.
- 62.
Loci argumentorum legales p. 50: “I don’t want not more to let you be unaware of that species forms part of genus and that genus forms also part of species, but in a different way. This is why, so that you would not be misled by the ambiguity of the word ‘to form part’, I informed you that something can be said ‘to form part of something else’ in two different ways.”
- 63.
It’s indicated in Latin by the expression: contentive sive comprehensive, who does not mean comprehensively, but well inclusively (continere and comprehendere with the meaning of: to be materially included or intellectually understood in something).
- 64.
The latin sentence says: illative, positive, consecutive seu per consequentiam.
- 65.
Op. cit. p.51: “The first way is done in inclusion, and in this case, the species forms part of the genus, that is, the species is contained or included in the genus, and it’s in this way that speak the end of the §. ‘but if the fact of defrauding’, when we say that the fraud is understood in the deceit, according to the first interpretation of the glose, see what say Bartole, Balde and the Doctors about this matter.” … “And its in this way that speaks D.50.17.80” [“In toto jure generi per speciem derogatur et illus potissimum habetur quod ad speciem derectum est”], see Dino de Mugello, [on this rule] in the Sexte [rule 34: “generi per speciem derogatur”], and the rule “plus semper” [rule 35: “plus semper in se continet quod est minus”], with its note and the glose turning on the same title of the same book. But in this case, the exception forms part of the rule, in other words, is included or contained in the rule, as say it perfectly the glose turning on the rubric ‘De regulis juris’ of the Sexte, and Dino de Mugello, Albericus Roxiati and the Doctors, about D.50.17.1. And in a general way, the special categories or which are less common, form part of the most general or most common, in other words, are included or understood in them, see D.50.17.147 [“Semper specialia generalibus insunt ”].
- 66.
Op. cit. p. 52: “In the second way, something is said to form part of something else, not in comprehension as I said, but by implication, or consecution, i.e. by the consequence; because the second term is implied or follows when the first term is stated; and thus, the genus, i.e. what is more common, is a part of the species, i.e. what is less common, because once the species is stated, the genus is stated; and once the least common is stated, the most common is stated, as with: it’s a man, consequently it’s an animal.”
- 67.
Op. cit. p. 53: “The genus or the most common, implies its species or the least common, by inclusion; thus, when the husband bequeaths to the wife the things which are at the wife’s disposal, then the things which were bought for she are supposed to be bequeathed to her.”
- 68.
Op. cit. p. 53: “But [from a comprehensive standpoint] the genus or the most common, does not imply the species, or the least common, because we have not the following consecution... it’s at the woman’s disposal, so, it is bought, because there can be another way of acquisition”. See also the conclusion of D.32.47 §.1: “If the husband bequeathed to the second wife the goods [not bought] which had the first wife, these goods are at the second wife’s disposal, even if the husband has bought nothing to her, and the legacies are obtained, even if they are not specifically allocated to her. But the goods which are bought for the first wife and which are at her disposal, are only due to the second wife if they are specifically allocated to her, because the husband did not think of the second when he bought them.”
- 69.
See in Gammarus: “De loco a toto universali, seu a genere ad speciem” and “De loco a specie ad genus”, op cit. pp. 23–28, and in Cantiuncula: op. cit. pp. 31–32.
- 70.
Op. cit. p. 47: “There exists in Law an other locus of frequent use, which we call a genere ad speciem, and which allows to obtain an argument which is not probable, but necessary.”
- 71.
Op. cit. p. 54. “The glose ... rightly says that the fact of declaring that the whole is in the part secundum quid [i.e. comprehensively], because the whole is not simply in the part [i.e. extensively], must always be understood... by the consequence and not by the contents. And this must be kept in memory, because if not, we can be easily deceive because of an error proceeding from what is said secundum quid to what is said as simply; see what I said in the former locus [a genere ad speciem] and what I will say in the next [a toto ad partem].”
- 72.
Op. cit. p. 53.
- 73.
Cantiuncula C.: Methodica dialectice ratio ad jurisprudentiam adcommodata (edition of Bâle, 1545), Chapter 7 (pp. 159–160). The Proemium of this book refers to the precursors of Cantiuncula, and especilally quotes Petrus Andreas Gammarus Bononiensis. Once more, it proves that the opposition mos italicus/mos gallicus is quite secondary when the thing to do is to elaborate a theory of legal reasoning.
- 74.
Sexte, book 5, De regulis juris, rule 54.
- 75.
Constitution Assiduis stated in C.8.17.12: “We were disturbed by the constant taking away [made on the goods] of women, whose they deplore that they make lose their dowries and [which are made] by creditors former [to the marriage], on the goods possessed by the husbands. This is why we examined the ancient laws which provide in personal actions, an important prerogative with the action for a claim for dowry, so that women have a privilege against almost all personal actions and that they come before the other creditors, even if they were former.”
- 76.
Johannes Franciscus de Ripa Papiensis, Commentaria primae and secundae left digesti novi and infortiati and postremo in primam codicis, fol.58 and 59, Lyon (edition of 1538): “It is said that the woman is preferred with all the creditors, by a special provision, for the things given by way of dowry. Consequently, she is not preferred with the other creditors for the rest of the husband’s goods and so, she is not preferred with those which have an express mortgage by the only fact that she comes before those which have a tacit mortgage in accordance with the Constitution Assiduis. And this opinion opposite to that of Bartole is more veracious and more common.”
- 77.
“Thus, every time that this is objected to them, from an other standpoint (i.e. when themselves argue as follows: the posterior dowry precedes the former tacit mortgage and this one [precedes the] middle express [mortgage], an so, the dowry [precedes] the latter; and that we object: start rather from the express mortgage in the following way: the middle express mortgage precedes the posterior dowry, the [posterior] dowry [precedes] the tacit former [mortgage], so, the first precedes the latter; or as follows: the former tacit mortgage precedes the middle express [mortgage], this one [precedes] the posterior dowry, so, the first precedes the latter), they immediately retort: this rule, ‘if I overcome, etc’, make a mistake in the two last relations. Thus, why doesn’t it mistaking in the same way (in the first relation) when you are in favor of the dowry?”
- 78.
Leibniz, De Casibus Perplexis, Chapter 22. Akademie der Wissenschaften, VI.2. (1990).
- 79.
Loci argumentorum legales, p. 729.
- 80.
Cf. D.24.3.1: “The cause of dowries is everywhere and always in favour. Because it’s the public interest to preserve the women’s dowries because it’s very necessary that women be provide with dowries to have children and to fill the city of them.”
- 81.
Cf. the works of Cantiuncula, but also and especially those, posterior, of Berlich, Carpzov and Leibniz.
Bibliography
Bobbio N and Bovero M (2002). ‘El caracter del Iusnaturalismo’, Sociedad y estado en la filosofia moderna, http://www.sociologia.de.
Cantiuncula C (1545). Topica legalia in Methodica dialectice ratio ad jurisprudentiam adcommodata, Bâle.
Cantiuncula C (1522). De ratione studii legalis paraenesis, Bâle.
Cantiuncula C (1545). Methodica dialectice ratio ad jurisprudentiam adcommodata, Bâle.
Everhardus N (1591). Loci argumentorum legales, Francfort.
Everhardus N (1610). Synopsis locorum legalium, Darmstadt.
Everhardus N (1539). Centum modi argumentandi, Venise.
Gammarus P (1522). Petri Andreae Gammari Bononiensis Dialecticae legalis sive topicorum libri III. Leipzig.
Leibniz (1665). De Casibus Perplexis, Chapter 22. Akademie der Wissenschaften, VI.2. (1990).
Villey M (1979). ‘L’interprétation’. Archives de Philosophie du Droit, t.XVII, pp. 72–88.
Viehweg T (1962). Topica e Giurisprudenza.Milano: Giuffrè editore.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Boucher, P. (2010). Inductive Topics and Reorganization of a Classification. In: Gabbay, D., Canivez, P., Rahman, S., Thiercelin, A. (eds) Approaches to Legal Rationality. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9588-6_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9588-6_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-9587-9
Online ISBN: 978-90-481-9588-6
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawLaw and Criminology (R0)