Abstract
This chapter proposes a dialectical approach to legal interpretation, consisting of three dimensions: (1) a formalization of the canons of interpretation in terms of argumentation schemes; (2) a dialectical classification of interpretive schemes; and (3) a logical and computational model for comparing the arguments pro and contra an interpretation. The traditional interpretive maxims or canons used in both common and civil law are translated into defeasible patterns of arguments, which can be evaluated through sets of corresponding critical questions. These interpretive argumentation schemes are classified in general categories and a distinction is drawn between schemes supporting and rebutting an interpretation. This framework allows conceiving statutory interpretation as a dialectical procedure consisting in weighing arguments pro and contra an interpretation. This procedure is formalized and represented computationally through tools from formal argumentation systems.
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Notes
- 1.
In Sartor chapter 3, part II, this volume, on “Defeasibility in Law,” a semantics based on labeling, which is equivalent to the extension based semantic here presented, was adopted.
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Acknowledgement
Fabrizio Macagno would like to thank the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia for the research grants no. IF/00945/2013, PTDC/IVC-HFC/1817/2014, and PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014. Douglas Walton would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for Insight Grant 435-2012-0104.
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Walton, D., Sartor, G., Macagno, F. (2018). Statutory Interpretation as Argumentation. In: Bongiovanni, G., Postema, G., Rotolo, A., Sartor, G., Valentini, C., Walton, D. (eds) Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9452-0_18
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