Natural Kinds as Scientific Models

Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 290)


The concept of natural kind is center stage in the debates about scientific realism. Champions of scientific realism such as Richard Boyd hold that our most developed scientific theories allow us to “cut the world at its joints” (Boyd, 1981, 1984, 1991). In the long run we can disclose natural kinds as nature made them, though as science progresses improvements in theory allow us to revise the extension of natural kind terms.


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Federal University of Santa Catarina, and CNPqFlorianópolisBrazil

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