Quasi-truth and Quantum Mechanics

  • Newton C.A. da Costa
  • Otávio Bueno
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 290)


Since its early formulation, non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM) has been the source of sustained controversy about its foundation. Despite its impressive empirical success, several foundational issues have not been settled by the theory: What exactly happens with the observables when a quantum system is not being measured? And what exactly happens during measurement? What is the nature of quantum particles? In particular, are they individuals or not? And can identity be applied to these particles? Not surprisingly, a variety of interpretations of QM have been developed in the attempt to address these and other foundational questions. Perhaps also not surprisingly, so far there has been no agreement as to which of these interpretations (if any) should be preferred.


Quantum Mechanic Partial Structure Partial Relation Empirical Adequacy Copenhagen Interpretation 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyFederal University of Santa CatarinaFlorianópolisBrazil
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MiamiCoral GablesUSA

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