Advertisement

Human Evolution: Compatibilist Approaches

Chapter
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 290)

Abstract

This paper discusses attempts to keep track of the evolution of the human mind which are commited to a commonsense image of ourselves as both agents and interpreters, following a compatibilist line. These attempts take also a bold stance concerning the role philosophy should play in looking for an integration of that commonsense image with an image of ourselves pressuposed by the natural sciences, especially by the biological sciences. Different scenarios for the philogeny of a distinctively human kind of mind, in the space of other animal minds, are compared. A new reading of Richerson and Boyd’s dual inheritance theory is proposed by adopting that compatibilist framework.

Keywords

Human evolution Kinds of mind Interpretive abilities Folk psychology Compatibilism Dual inheritance theory 

References

  1. Abrantes, P. (2006). A psicologia de senso comum em cenários para a evolução da mente humana. Manuscrito, Campinas, 29(1): 185–257.Google Scholar
  2. Abrantes, P. (2010). La imagen filosófica de los agentes humanos y la evolución en el linaje homínido. In: Labastida Ochoa, J., Aréchiga Córdova, V., (eds.), Identidad y diferencia. México, DF: Siglo XXI.Google Scholar
  3. Baker, L. R. (1995). Explaining attitudes: a practical approach to the mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  4. Baker, L. R. (2001). Philosophy in mediis rebus. Metaphilosophy, 32(4): 378–394.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Blackmore, S. (2000). The meme machine. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Boyd, R., Richerson, P. (2005a). The origin and evolution of cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Cosmides, L., Toody, J. (2000). Consider the source: the evolution of adaptations for decoupling and metarepresentations. In: Sperber, D., (ed.), Metarepresentations: a multidisciplinary perspective. 53–115.Google Scholar
  8. Dennett, D. (1986). Conditions of Personhood. In: Dennett, D., (ed.), Brainstorms. Sussex: Harvester Press, pp. 267–285.Google Scholar
  9. Dennett, D. (1987). Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: the ‘panglosian paradigm’ defended. In: Dennett, D., (ed.), The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 237–268.Google Scholar
  10. Dennett, D. (1991). Three kinds of intentional psychology. In: Rosenthal, D., (ed.), The nature of mind. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, pp. 613–633.Google Scholar
  11. Dennett, D. (1998). Two contrasts: folk craft versus folk science, and belief versus opinion. In: Dennett, D., (ed.), Brainchildren: essays on designing minds. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, pp. 81–94.Google Scholar
  12. Dennett, D. (2000). Making tools for thinking. In: Sperber, D., (ed.), Metarepresentations: a multidisciplinary perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 17–29.Google Scholar
  13. Donald, M. (1991). Origins of the modern mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Godfrey-Smith, P. (1998). Complexity and the function of mind in nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2002a). On the evolution of representational and interpretive capacities. The Monist, 85(1): 50–69.Google Scholar
  16. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2002b). Environmental complexity and the evolution of cognition. In: Sternberg, R., Kaufman, J., (eds.), The evolution of cognition. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum, pp. 233–249.Google Scholar
  17. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003a). Folk psychology under stress: comments on Susan Hurley’s ‘Animal action in the space of reasons’. Mind & Language, 18(3): 266–272.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003b). Theory and reality. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  19. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2004). On Folk Psychology and Mental Representation. In: H. Claping; P. Staines; P. Slezak (eds.), Representation in mind: new approaches to Mental Representation. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 147–162.Google Scholar
  20. Godfrey-Smith, P. (2005). Untangling the evolution of mental representation. In: Zilhão, A., (ed.), Cognition, evolution, and rationality: a cognitive science for the XXIst Century. London: Routledge, pp. 85–102, The references to this paper are taken from a pre-print version.Google Scholar
  21. Goldman, A. I. (2006). Simulating minds: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  22. Hurley, S. (2003a). Animal action in the space of reasons. Mind & Language, 18(3): 231–256.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Hurley, S. (2003b). Making sense of Animals: interpretation vs. architecture. Mind & Language, 18(3): 273–280.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Hurley, S. (2005). Social heuristics that make us smarter: instrumental rationality, collective activity, mirroring, and mind reading. Philosophical Psychology, 18(5): 585–611.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Kornblith, H. (2002). Knowledge and its place in nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Ratclife, M. (2005). Folk psychology and the biological basis of intersubjectivity. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 80(Supplement 56): 211–233.Google Scholar
  27. Richerson, P., Boyd, R. (2005b). Not by genes alone: how culture transformed human evolution. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  28. Richerson, P., Boyd, R., Henrich, J. (2010). Gene-culture coevolution in the age of genomics. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), 107(2): 8985–8992.Google Scholar
  29. Sterelny, K. (1990). The representational theory of mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
  30. Sterelny, K. (1998). Reductionism in the Philosophy of Mind. In: Craig, E. (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, version 1.0. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  31. Sterelny, K. (2003a). Charting control-space: comments on Susan Hurley’s ‘Animal action in the space of reasons’. Mind & Language, 18(3): 257–265.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Sterelny, K. (2003b). Thought in a hostile world. Malden, MA: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  33. Stich, S. (2004). Some questions from the not-so-hostile world. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82(3): 503–511.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of BrasíliaBrasíliaBrazil

Personalised recommendations