Reputational Penalties in Financial Markets: An Ethical Mechanism?

  • Peter-Jan Engelen
  • Marc van Essen
Part of the Issues in Business Ethics book series (IBET, volume 31)


Responsible investment (RI) and responsible corporate behaviour received a lot of attention during the last decade in the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature (McWilliams and Siegel 2001, 2006). After the U.S. and European financial markets were being troubled in the early 2000s by several major scandals like Enron, Worldcom, Tyco and Parmalat, financial ethics received a lot of attention by the public as well. Irresponsible corporate behaviour can occur in different ways such as corruption, market abuse, fraud, insider trading, ecological harm, racial or sexual discrimination. Examples include foreign briberies to get supply contracts (Volkswagen), insider trading ahead of a profit warning (EADS), lower salaries for female employees (Wal-Mart), and worker’s conditions in Indonesia (Nike).


Corporate Social Responsibility Stock Market Stock Price Abnormal Return Inside Trading 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Utrecht UniversityUtrechtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Rotterdam School of ManagementErasmus UniversityRotterdamThe Netherlands

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