General Concept of Matter: To Be Is To Become

Chapter
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 287)

Abstract

One may peruse an encyclopedia of physics without ever encountering the word “matter”, even though the entire work deals with nothing else. For example, solid state physicists study material things in the solid state, not the latter in itself. A major reason for the omission of the noun “matter” and the adjective “material” is that the concept of matter is a very general ontological category: in physics there is no general theory of matter, just as there is no general theory of processes.

Keywords

Dark Energy Material Object Casimir Force Ontological Concept Material Thing 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dept. of PhilosophyMcGill UniversityMontrealCanada

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