Philosophy as Worldview

  • Mario Bunge
Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 287)


A worldview is a comprehensive conception of all there is, whereas a philosophy is a scholarly discipline divided into special fields, every one of which is usually cultivated independently of the others. For example, the typical philosopher of mind won’t be interested in the philosophy of matter. As a consequence, he may find it hard to believe that matter can think. Or else he may be so radical a naturalist that he may believe that brains secrete cultures. I wish to restore the traditional unity of philosophy conceived of as an elaborate worldview or, if preferred, as a theory of everything. Such a unitary or integrated conception of philosophy should help place every philosophical problem in a network of knowledge items, instead of tackling it as an isolated puzzle.


Ontological Category Impossible World Copenhagen Interpretation Practical Philosophy Social Ontology 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. Barrow, John D., Paul C. W. Davies, and Charles L. Harper, Jr., eds. 2004. Science and ultimate reality: Quantum theory, cosmology, and complexity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  2. –––––. 1974a. Treatise on basic philosophy, vol. 1: Sense and reference. Dordrecht, NL: Reidel.Google Scholar
  3. ––––. 1981. Collected works, vol. 38: Philosophical Notebooks [1914–1915]. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.Google Scholar
  4. –––––. 1979a. Treatise on basic philosophy, vol. 4: A world of systems. Dordrecht, NL: Reidel.Google Scholar
  5. ––––. 1981. Scientific materialism. Dordrecht, NL: Reidel.Google Scholar
  6. ––––––. 2007. Freedom & Neurobiology. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
  8. –––––. 1997. A world of states of affair. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Popper, Karl R. 1967. Knowledge: Subjective versus objective. In ed. Miller, 1985, 58–77.Google Scholar
  10. ––––. 1959b. Metascientific queries. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.Google Scholar
  11. –––––. 1959a. Causality: The place of the causal principle in modern science, 4th rev. ed. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008.Google Scholar
  12. ––––. 1961. Laws of physical laws. American Journal of Physics 29: 518–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. –––––. 1974b. The relations of logic and semantics to ontology. Journal of Philosophical Logic 3: 195–210.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. –––––. 1967b. Foundations of physics. New York: Springer-Verlag.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. –––––. 1999. The sociology-philosophy connection. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.Google Scholar
  16. –––––. 1970. In Principles of emergent realism, ed. W. Preston Warren. St. Louis, MO: Warren H. Green.Google Scholar
  17. Kant, Immanuel. 1780. Metaphysik II, Reflexionen auf losen Blättern. In Gesammelte Schriften, AAXVIII: Handschriftlicher Nachlass. Akademie Ausgabe. Online: Scholar
  18. –––––. 2006a. Chasing reality. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Google Scholar
  19. Lewis, David. 1986. On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  20. Everett, Hugh, III. 1957. “Relative state” formulation of quantum mechanics. Reviews of Modern Physics 29: 454–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. ––––. 2009. Political philosophy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.Google Scholar
  22. ––––. 2004. Consciousness and its objects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  23. –––––. 2007a. Max Weber did not practise the philosophy he preached. In Max Weber’s “Objectivity” revisited, ed. Lawrence McFalls, 119–34. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.Google Scholar
  24. Barraclough, Geoffrey. 1979. Main trends in history. New York and London: Holmes & Meier.Google Scholar
  25. Hobsbawm, Eric. 1997. On history. New York: The New Press.Google Scholar
  26. Graham, Loren R. 1981. Between science and values. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Dept. of PhilosophyMcGill UniversityMontrealCanada

Personalised recommendations