The Limits of Biomedical Ethics and the Specific Role of Phenomenology in Biomedical Ethics
Let me first begin by expressing two general reservations I have long held about the project of applied philosophy in general. These have to do not just with applications of philosophy to the sphere of medical decision-making and to debates about public policy or regulations that concern the development and practice of medical treatments and technologies, but to the project of applied philosophy in general—and most especially to that project as it is very often practiced in philosophical debates couched in the language and using the concepts and techniques of Anglo-American analytical philosophy.
KeywordsHard Case Applied Ethic Biomedical Ethic Public Policy Maker Philosophical Reflection
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