Abstract
We take another look at Reichenbach’s 1920 conversion to conventionalism, with a special eye to the background of his ‘conventionality of distant simultaneity’ thesis. We argue that elements of Reichenbach earlier neo-Kantianism can still be discerned in his later work and, related to this, that his conventionalism should be seen as situated at the level of global theory choice. This is contrary to many of Reichenbach’s own statements, in which he declares that his conventionalism is a consequence of the arbitrariness of coordinative definitions.
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© 2010 Springer Netherlands
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Dieks, D. (2010). Reichenbach and the Conventionality of Distant Simultaneity in Perspective. In: Stadler, F. (eds) The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, vol 1. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9115-4_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9115-4_23
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