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Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory

  • Kalyan Chatterjee
Chapter
Part of the Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation book series (AGDN, volume 4)

Abstract

This chapter describes the major ideas contributed to the study of negotiation by non-cooperative game theory. Several different lines of research are described, including the strategy for making demands, the role of time, and the more recent analyses of coalitional bargaining. Related chapters include the Cooperative Game Theory Approaches described by Kibris (in this volume), the applications of game theory in voting systems and fair division methods (see chapters by Nurmi and Klamler, this volume), and the game-theory-related Conflict Analysis and Drama methods (see chapter by Kilgour and Hipel, and Bryant, this volume).

Keywords

Reservation Price Coalition Formation Grand Coalition Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Nash Bargaining Solution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsThe Pennsylvania State UniversityUniversity ParkUSA

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