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Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation pp 141–149Cite as

Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory

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Part of the book series: Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation ((AGDN,volume 4))

Abstract

This chapter describes the major ideas contributed to the study of negotiation by non-cooperative game theory. Several different lines of research are described, including the strategy for making demands, the role of time, and the more recent analyses of coalitional bargaining. Related chapters include the Cooperative Game Theory Approaches described by Kibris (in this volume), the applications of game theory in voting systems and fair division methods (see chapters by Nurmi and Klamler, this volume), and the game-theory-related Conflict Analysis and Drama methods (see chapter by Kilgour and Hipel, and Bryant, this volume).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Unfortunately, there now seems to be an ideological predilection against publishing game-theoretic papers in some of the leading operations research journals; some editors believe that only experiments are worthwhile in game theory. Thus the injunction to young researchers is “Go forth and experiment”, never mind on what, since it needn’t be on evaluating theories against each other – given that theories don’t deserve to be published.

  2. 2.

    This condition basically says that if we subtract v({i}) from the worth of each coalition of which i is a member, the resulting characteristic function is strategically equivalent. This is not true in the Rubinstein game with outside options, for example. A game with a pie of 1 and two players with outside options of 0.6 and 0 is not strategically equivalent to one where a surplus of 0.4 is split among two players. (In the first, the Rubinstein limiting solution gives (0.6,0.4); in the second (0.8,0.2).

  3. 3.

    This is not always a natural assumption and has been criticised (see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)). As mentioned earlier, a formal justification of stationarity as economising on complexity costs was formulated for the unanimity game by Chatterjee and Sabourian (2000).

  4. 4.

    This means that if \(S\subset T,\) then < \(v(\{S\cup i\})-v(S) v(\{T\cup i\})-v(T),\)for all \(i,S,T.\)

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA, 16802, USA

    Kalyan Chatterjee

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  1. Kalyan Chatterjee
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Correspondence to Kalyan Chatterjee .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, University Ave. W. 75, Waterloo, N2L 3C5, Canada

    D. Marc Kilgour

  2. Strathclyde Business School, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, G4 0QU, United Kingdom

    Colin Eden

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Chatterjee, K. (2010). Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory. In: Kilgour, D., Eden, C. (eds) Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation. Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9097-3_9

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