Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, which brought about a shrinking of the size of national armies, one can observe an increased role of private military and security companies in conflict areas. States, most notably the United States of America and the United Kingdom, but increasingly also other states such as South Africa, are outsourcing war efforts, while in general progressively more tasks are being contracted out to Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) The major difference between traditional armies and PMSCs is the contract-base on which these companies work. The PMSCs provide a wide pallet of services ranging from consultancy to combat, and it amy be easier to categorize some of these activities as military than others such as logistic services, training and operational support.
On September 16, 2007 private security contractors working for the company Blackwater were escorting an armed convoy when, according to Iraqi government officials, they with no justification shot and killed 17 civilians, leaving 24 injured in the Nisoor Square neighborhood of Baghdad. This was the seventh shooting of civilians involving Blackwater.1
1See for a detailed discussion, also of other examples, the 2008 report of the NGO Human Rights First, Report on Private Security Contractors at War – Ending the Culture of Impunity, 2008, available at: http://humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/08115-usls-psc-final.pdf. Employees of Blackwater have not been criminally prosecuted but are facing civil claims in the courts of the United States. For more on the possibility of civil litigation in such cases see Section 11.4 of this article.
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Notes
- 1.
According to Kate Allen, 70–85% of private security companies are based in the UK or the US: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/533/53306.htma13. For more detail on South Africa, see Taljaard, R. (2006). ‘Implementing South Africa’s Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act’, In: Caparini M. & Bryden A. (eds). Private Actors and Security Governance, Berlin, Lit Verlag and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).
- 2.
See the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs, Employing Private Military Companies, The Hague, December 2007, and Human Rights First, Report on Private Security Contractors at War – Ending the Culture of Impunity, 2008, available at: http://humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/08115-usls-psc-final.pdf.
- 3.
Appendix C, Report Human Rights First, op. cit.
- 4.
Examples given by Jeff Vail: Vail, J. (2006). The Private Law of War, 11 May, p. 6, available at: http://www.jeffvail.net/privatelawofwar.pdf.
- 5.
Report Human Rights First, op. cit., p. 3.
- 6.
Jennifer, E.K., Schwartz, M., & Nakamura, K.H. (2008). ‘CRS Report for Congress, Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues, Order Code RL32419’, Updated 25 August 2008, p. 5: All three contractors – Blackwater Worldwide, DynCorp International LLC, and Triple Canopy, Inc. – working for the Department of State under the Worldwide Personal Protective Services contract have had employees killed and wounded. According to Blackwater, 32 employees have been killed and more than 46 wounded. Overall, an estimated 1,000 employees of PMSCs have lost their lives and since 2003 an estimated 12,000 have been injured. Report Human Rights First, op. cit., p. 5.
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
This ‘layer on layer’ approach is, for example, the official policy of the US government when outsourcing activities in Iraq. According to the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) a contract is granted to one party which is responsible for getting the task done. This contractor subsequently employs other parties. This results in a myriad of contracts making the situation very misty. See Hiemstra R.R.K. (2007). ‘De nieuwe vrije lansier’, Militair Rechtelijk Tijdschrift, p. 205.
- 10.
According to Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ICRC legal advisor, some 80% of the contracts of PMCs/PSCs are concluded with clients other than States. ICRC-review, 2006, p. 532.
- 11.
Report Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs, op. cit., p. 9.
- 12.
Report Human Rights First, op. cit., p. 2. Elsea, Schwartz, Nakamura, op. cit., p. 3: “Some 50 private security contractors employing more than 30,000 employees are working in Iraq for an array of clients, including governments, private industry, and international organizations such as the United Nations.”
- 13.
Ibidem.
- 14.
Deborah Avant, op. cit.; Report Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs, op. cit., p. 10.
- 15.
MacDonald, A. (2007). ‘Dogs of War Redux? Private Military Contractors and the “New Mercenarism”’, Mílitair Rechtelijk Tijdschrift, p. 210.
- 16.
Ibidem.
- 17.
UK Green Paper (2002). ‘Private Military Companies: Option for Regulation, London’, The Stationary Office, paragraph 30.
- 18.
PMSCs have for instance announced their intention to expand their operations by offering their services to corporations that are in need of protection against the threat of piracy before the coast of Somalia.
- 19.
- 20.
See MacDonald, op. cit., p. 222–225. See for the contrary conclusion, the 2008 CRS report mentioned above footnote 7. They may be qualified as mercenaries when the employees are non-nationals of the sending or host state, but of a third country. They are contracted out of a profit motive and are actually involved in the hostilities.
- 21.
Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 44/34 of 4 December 1989.
- 22.
OAU Doc. CM/817 (XXiX) Annex II Rev. 1. (1977). reprinted in Gino J. Naldi (ed.) (1992). Documents of the Organisation of African Unity 58 (1992).
- 23.
As pointed out by Vail, op. cit., p. 10, All this has everything to do with the fact that the main drivers behind the UN Mercenary Convention, as it is know, were African States that were careful not to upgrade the prohibition of mercenary to include modern-day private military corporations given their large dependency on the services of the African PMC Executive Outcomes. In the 1980s and the 1990s the company played an often crucial role in supporting African governments as a direct combat provider in conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Kenya, and Congo.
- 24.
- 25.
Vail, op. cit., p. 10–11.
- 26.
- 27.
Ibidem.
- 28.
- 29.
Gillard, op. cit., p. 533. For a detailed and thorough discussion of this question, see the Report of the Expert Meeting on Private Military Contractors: Status and State responsibility for their Actions, University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, 29–30 August 2005. Available at: http://www.adh-geneva.ch/research/pdf/travaux/4/rapport_compagnies_privees.pdf, p. 9–12.
- 30.
Gillard, op. cit., p. 533.
- 31.
Article 4A (2) GC 3. Also see AP I.
- 32.
Gillard, op. cit., p. 534–535.
- 33.
The latter requirement is however not undisputed. See Gillard, op. cit., p. 538–539. See also Report of the Expert Meeting on Private Military Contractors, op. cit., pp. 14–15.
- 34.
Report, Human Rights First, op. cit., p. 5.
- 35.
On 31 March 2004, four Blackwater contractors were ambushed, killed and mutilated by a mob in Fallujah, Iraq. The families of the four men ultimately sought legal redress from the corporation Blackwater. See report Human Rights First, op. cit., appendix G.
- 36.
See, inter alia, Jägers, Nicola (2002). Corporate Human Rights Obligations: In search of accountability, Antwerp, Intersentia.
- 37.
Jägers, op. cit. International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) (2002). Beyond Voluntarism. Human rights and the developing international legal obligations of companies, ICHRP, Geneva; Clapham, Andrew (2006). Obligations of Non-State Actors, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006; Genugten, W.J.M. van, (2000). ‘The Status of Transnational Corporations in International Public Law’, in: Eide, Asbjørn., Helge, Ole Bergesen., & Pia Rudolfson, Goyer (eds.). Human Rights and the Oil Industry, Antwerp/Groningen/Oxford, Intersentia, pp. 71–89.
- 38.
A/Res/60/147, Principles 1, 3 and 17.
- 39.
Mongelard, E. (2006). ‘Corporate Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, ICRC-review, pp. 671–673.
- 40.
See the Report of the International Law Commission on the Draft Articles, UN GAOR Supp No 10 UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001). The DARS are not a legally binding document. However, almost all provisions do bind states that have not persistently objected as they constitute customary international law.
- 41.
Report of the Expert Meeting on Private Military Contractors, op. cit., p.12–13.
- 42.
See Crawford, J. (ed.) (2003). ‘The International Law Commissions Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries’, Cambridge, Cambridge University press, p. 100.
- 43.
Gillard, op. cit., p. 555.
- 44.
Report of the Expert Meeting on Private Military Contractors, op. cit., p. 18.
- 45.
Crawford, op. cit., p. 114–115.
- 46.
Gillard, p. 555.
- 47.
Crawford, op. cit., p. 110, para. 1. Report of the Expert Meeting on Private Military Contractors, op. cit., p. 18–19.
- 48.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits). ICJ, 27 June 1986, ICJ Rep 1986, p. 14.
- 49.
Prosecutor v. Tadic (Appeals Chamber Judgment ICTY-IT-94-1-A). 15 July 1999.
- 50.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) 2007, ICJ Rep 4. For an analysis of the ICJ Genocide case, see Antonio Cassese, EJIL, 18, no. 4, p. 649.
- 51.
Bosnia v Serbia case, para. 400.
- 52.
Ibidem, para. 406.
- 53.
Ibidem, Dissenting opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, para. 39.
- 54.
Ibidem, p. 112, para. 5.
- 55.
Advisory Council on International Affairs, op. cit., p. 42 and 44, and passim.
- 56.
Report of the Expert Meeting on Private Military Contractors, op. cit., pp. 19–20.
- 57.
See amongst others Engström, V. (2002). Who is Responsible for Corporate Human Rights Violations? Åbo Akademi University, Institute for Human Rights, January, p. 19.
- 58.
Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Working Group of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of People to Self-Determination’, 9 January 2008, A/HRC/7/7, para. 51.
- 59.
See on HRC’s interpretation of positive obligations: Human Rights Committee, General Comment 3, ‘Article 2, Implementation at the National Level, Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, p. 4 (1994). Also see Klein, E. (2000). ‘The Duty to Protect and to Ensure Human Rights Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, In: Klein, Eckart (ed.), The Duty to Protect and to Ensure Human Rights, (Colloquium Potsdam, 1–3 July 1999). Berlin, Berlin Verlag, pp. 296–297.
- 60.
See for more on the nature of State obligations in the field of economic, social and cultural rights: Commission on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment, ‘The Nature of States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, 14/12/90).
- 61.
Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C, No. 4; Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, ECrtHR, App. No. 22535/93, Judgment of 28 March 2000, paras. 101, 108–109; Kilic v. Turkey, ECrtHR, App. No. 22492/93, Judgment of 28 March 2000, paras. 77 and 83.
- 62.
Velasquez Rodriguez Case, op. cit., para. 172. See for more details of this and other cases and for extraterritorial application of human rights in relation to private military and security companies: Coomans, F. and M.T. Kamminga (eds.) (2004). Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, Antwerp/Oxford, Intersentia.
- 63.
Judgment of 25 March 1993.
- 64.
Report of the Expert Meeting on Private Military Contractors, op. cit., pp. 33–40.
- 65.
Ibidem, p. 37.
- 66.
Ibidem, p. 31.
- 67.
Responsibility of International Organisations. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-fourth session (2002). Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-seventh session, Supplement no. 10 (A/57/10), Chapter VII.
- 68.
Report of the Expert Meeting on Private Military Contractors, op. cit., p. 32.
- 69.
18 U.S.C. § 7(9) (amended by the § 804 of the US Patriot Act, P.L. 107–56, title VIII, 26 October, 2001, 115 Stat. 377) (excluding persons covered by the MEJA, see below).
- 70.
Elena, Schwartz and Nakamura, op. cit., p. 21.
- 71.
18 U.S.C. § 113, 114, 1111, 1201, 2241–45, 2248.
- 72.
Department of Justice Press release, “David Passaro Sentence to 100 Months Imprisonment: First American Civilian Convicted of Detainee Abuse During the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan”, February 13, 2007, available at: http://charlotte.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/2007/ce021307.htm.
- 73.
P.L. 106–523, 114 Stat. 2488 (2000). Codified at 18 U.S.C. 3261–6718. For information on the legislative history, see Glenn R. Schmitt, ‘Closing the Gap in Criminal Jurisdiction over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces Abroad – a First Person Account of the Creation of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000’, 51 Cath. U. L. Rev. 55 (2001).
- 74.
Report Human Rights First, op. cit., p. 25.
- 75.
Ibidem.
- 76.
Ibidem, citing the MEJA.
- 77.
(H.R. 2740) on October 4, 2007.
- 78.
‘Closing Legal Loopholes: Prosecuting Sexual Assault and Other Violent Crimes Committed Overseas by American Civilians in a Combat Environment, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’, 110th Cong. (9 April 2008).
- 79.
The US CRS, 2008, op. cit.
- 80.
U.S.C., Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 47 S. 801 or 64 Stat. 109, 10 U.S.C. Chapter 47.
- 81.
US Code Collection, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part II, Chapter 47, Subchapter I, § 802, Art. 2.
- 82.
Report Human Rights First, op. cit., p. 28.
- 83.
Report Human Rights First, op. cit., pp. 28–29.
- 84.
Press Release, Multi-National Corps, ‘Civilian contractor convicted at a court-martial (Bagdad)’, 23 June, 2008, No. 20080623-01, available at: http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20671&Itemid=21.
- 85.
354 U.S. 1 (1957). See also O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 267 (1969): court-martials have no jurisdiction to try those who are not members of the Armed Forces, no matter how intimate the connection between their offense and the concerns of military discipline.
- 86.
For a detailed analysis of the relevant cases, see: CRS, 2008, pp. 26–31.
- 87.
See for these initiatives: Elena, Schwartz & Nakamura, op. cit., pp. 30–31.
- 88.
Ryngaert, C. (2007). “Universal Tort Jurisdiction over Gross Human Rights Violations”, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, T.M.C. Asser Press, Vol. 38, pp. 3–60.
- 89.
Ryngaert, op. cit., p. 16.
- 90.
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey). PCIJ Rep., Series A, No. 10, (1927).
- 91.
Stephens, B. (2002). ‘Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations’, Yale JIL, 27, r. 40.
- 92.
124 S. Ct. 2783. See also Kamminga, M.T. (2005). “Universal Civil Jurisdiction: Is it legal? Is it desirable?”, ASIL Proceeding, p. 125, for the argument of consistency of universal jurisdiction under international law.
- 93.
See Rygnaert, op. cit., pp. 26 and 35–41.
- 94.
ICJ Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium). Judgment of 14 February 2002, I.C.J. Reports 2002.
- 95.
Ibidem, para. 45.
- 96.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980).
- 97.
Kadic v. Karadzic 70 F.3d 232 (2d. Cir. 1995).
- 98.
Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
- 99.
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999). See for many more examples the website: http://www.business-humanrights.org and the reports by the UN Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on business and human rights Prof. John Ruggie, April 2008 (A/HRC/8/5) and April 2009 (A/HRC/11/13).
- 100.
Garmon, T. (2003). ‘Domesticating International Corporate Responsibility: Holding Private Military Firms Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act’, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law, 11, 325, 346, citing Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2002). In Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2001), p. 947, the aiding and abetting standard is derived from international law, see: Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 10 December 1998, p. 249; and Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, 27 January, 2000, p. 181.
- 101.
Doe v Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2001), p. 947.
- 102.
Tina Garmon, op. cit, p. 949–950 and 951. Also see A. Sebok, ‘Taking Tort Law Seriously The Alien Tort Statute’, 33 Brook. J. Int’l L. 3, 2008, p. 871.
- 103.
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002); 226 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2000).
- 104.
Dahl, M.C. (2008). ‘Soldiers of Fortune – Holding private Security Contractors Accountable: The Alien Tort Claims Act And Its Potential Application To Abtan v. Blackwater USA’, ExpressO, 2008, available at: http://works.bepress.com/matthew_dahl/1.
- 105.
Saleh et. al v. Titan Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (2004); and Ibrahim et al. v. Titan Corp. 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (2005).
- 106.
Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2007). WL 3274784, p. 3.
- 107.
Estate of Himoud Saed Abtan, et al. v. Blackwater Lodge and Training Center, Inc., et al., available at: http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/atban,-et-al.-v.-blackwater-usa,-et-al.
- 108.
See for this argument also: Matthew C. Dahl, op. cit., pp. 21–22.
- 109.
Ibidem, pp. 20–23.
- 110.
Kadic v. Karadzic 70 F.3d 232 (2d. Cir. 1995).
- 111.
Ibidem, I.A.2.(c).
- 112.
22 U.S.C. § 2778 (U.S.C. Title 22, Chapter 39, Subchapter III, Military Export Controls).
- 113.
See also Cottier, M. (2007). ‘Elements for Contracting and Regulating Private Security and Military Companies’, International Review of the Red Cross, 88, April, r. 653: “Regulating the export of services that may result in the use of force may contribute to promoting respect for international law by controlling who exports what services and where they are exported to, and by establishing standards that would hopefully marginalize disreputable companies and individuals. Additional reasons for a state to consider regulating the export of military or security services may include the possibility that the activities of companies or nationals from that state negatively reflect on its reputation.”
- 114.
Also see, however, Drew Cullen, ‘ITT fined $100m for shipping night vision goggles to China’, available at: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/03/27/itt_fined_for_illegal_exports/.
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The authors wish to thank Eefje de Volder for her willingness to read and comment on an earlier draft. This article has benefited greatly from her lucid remarks. Naturally, any remaining mistakes are ours.
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van Genugten, W., van der Heijden, MJ., Jägers, N. (2011). Protecting the Victims of the Privatization of War. In: Letschert, R., van Dijk, J. (eds) The New Faces of Victimhood. Studies in Global Justice, vol 8. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9020-1_11
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