Abstract
While toleration is widely considered a fundamental political principle in liberal societies, for critics of traditional conceptions of this principle, such as Anna Elisabetta Galeotti, the idea of toleration as non-interference is increasingly unsuited to respond to the type of pluralism characteristic of these societies. For Galeotti, the most important cases of toleration in contemporary liberal societies arise not due to the plurality of individual values and beliefs, but stem from the coexistence of diverse groups and cultures with unequal standing. When socially despised groups seek to exhibit their differences in the public sphere in an attempt to secure equal social standing and respect, Galeotti proposes a positive form of ‘toleration as recognition’. This paper argues that, while Galeotti’s analysis offers a powerful critique of conceptions of pluralism that seek to confine difference and diversity to the non-political private sphere, her notion of ‘toleration as recognition’ ultimately fails to provide an adequate response to the complex issues of power and identity central to her critique of traditional conceptions of toleration. For, not only does her conception of ‘toleration as recognition’ remain ambiguous, but Galeotti pays insufficient attention to the social and political processes that shape the very identities that are to be recognised.
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Notes
- 1.
As Galeotti states: ‘However conceived of, it is clear that toleration must have limits, because there are some forms of behaviour and practices that cannot be tolerated: for example, homicide, rape and robbery are obviously not candidates for toleration (2002: 22).
- 2.
According to Jones (2006), we could recognise a group we disapprove of by combining general recognition (i.e., recognise members of the group as fellow citizens); subject recognition (i.e. include the group within a category that already enjoys recognition); and mediated recognition (i.e. include the group within a more general identity, which in turn provides a reason for the subsequent recognition of the group’s specific identity). Yet, Jones argues, such forms of recognition fall short of Galeotti’s demand for the direct, unmediated recognition of particular identities. Thus, on Galeotti’s account, ‘only if Muslims secure recognition as Muslims, and gays as gays, will we surmount the obstacles to their full inclusion’ (Jones 2006: 137/8).
- 3.
As Seglow (2003) notes, while Galeotti assumes that purely institutional recognition will gradually lead to wide recognition, there are, of course, no guarantees that this will indeed be the case. Purely institutional recognition may just as well give rise to a backlash on the part of the majority.
- 4.
Given that states, confronted with numerous demands for recognition, will have to decide which demands are justified and in what order of priority, it may well be in a group’s interests to make stronger rather than weaker claims for recognition, given that the former may well be seen as an indicator of a greater degree of exclusion and may thus be regarded as more pressing.
- 5.
While Galeotti’s main examples – the wearing of the Islamic veil in public schools, the admission of gays into the army and the recognition of same sex marriages – focus on potentially less radical and controversial demands for changes in public standards, rules and conventions to accommodate the needs and desires of minorities, she offers a sixfold typology of potential group-differentiated laws and policies, ranging from claims for the public toleration of social differences and claims for limiting toleration to demands for special support to secure the integrity of a minority and claims for collective rights to group autonomy and group liberty (see 197–219). Although Galeotti maintains that claims for collective liberty fall outside the scope of a politics of ‘toleration as recognition’, since these are demands for ‘separation’ rather than inclusion on equal terms, she acknowledges that in cases of serious group conflict and enmity, where the only alternatives are cultural domination, repression and terrorism, it may well be appropriate to grant such demands. While this may well be true, Galotti fails to consider the extent to which a politics informed by ‘toleration as recognition’, may encourage groups to exaggerate their differences and thus may itself help to stoke up levels of conflict and enmity.
- 6.
I would like to thank Monica Mookherjee for this point.
- 7.
- 8.
Occasional campaigns to publicly ‘out’ so called ‘closet gays’ provide one example of the possible peer group pressures in this regard.
- 9.
According to Shachar (2001: 36) such ‘reactive culturalism’ is evident in religious communities ranging from ‘Orthodox Judaism to Islamic traditionalism to Evangelical Protestantism’. Such groups typically seek to control significant aspects of their members’ everyday lives and frequently ‘petition the state for legal permission to do so’.
- 10.
Here feminists frequently express concern about the impact on women of practices such as female circumcision (which Galeotti regards as beyond the limits of ‘toleration as recognition’), polygamy, child marriages or forced marriages and gender-differentiated rules regarding divorce. In addition there are worries relating to gender equality in relation to access to education, employment and vulnerability to violence.
- 11.
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Baumeister, A. (2011). Diversity and Equality: ‘Toleration as Recognition’ Reconsidered. In: Mookherjee, M. (eds) Democracy, Religious Pluralism and the Liberal Dilemma of Accommodation. Studies in Global Justice, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9017-1_6
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