Advertisement

Hart’s Critical Positivism

  • Gerald J. Postema
Chapter

Abstract

At the end of chapter 1 we found ourselves on the eve of Hart’s inaugural lecture in 1952. In mid-century, British jurisprudence was in a very different state from its counterpart across the Atlantic. For several decades American jurisprudence had struggled with vigorous challenges posed by realist rebels, conceding or domesticating some of them, making adjustments in response to others, and rejecting yet others outright. Always pragmatic and skeptical of grand theory, American jurisprudence made up for its lack of philosophical sophistication with a rough-edged vitality and a determination to locate all theorizing in the rough-and-tumble of ordinary legal practice. In contrast, British jurisprudence at mid-century had settled into a comfortable orthodoxy. Bentham’s rich, radical speculations about the nature and logic of law, and his meticulous articulation of systematic principles of legislation, procedure, and constitutional design, lay buried in a pile of unpublished manuscripts and Bowring’s (1838–43) inferior and unreadable nineteenth century edition of his works, surviving only in the simpler and more rigid creed taught by latter-day Austinians.

Keywords

Legal System Legal Rule Legal Obligation Social Rule Critical Positivism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Bibliography

  1. ———. 1999b. “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”: Formalism in Law and Morality. University of Chicago Law Review 66: 530–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. ———. 1999. A Defence of Radbruch’s Formula. In Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order. Ed. David Dyzenhaus, 15–39. Portland: Hart.Google Scholar
  3. Austin, J.L. 1956–1957. A Plea for Excuses. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 57 (N.S.): 1–30.Google Scholar
  4. ———. 1962. How To Do Things with Words. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  5. ———. 1954. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Ed. H.L.A. Hart. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.Google Scholar
  6. Baker, G.P. 1977. Defeasibility and Meaning. In Law, Morality, and Society. Ed. P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz, 26–57. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  7. Bentham, Jeremy. 1970. Of Laws in General. Ed. H.L.A. Hart. London: Athlone.Google Scholar
  8. ———. 1977. A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government. Ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart. London: Athlone.Google Scholar
  9. ———. 1996. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart. With a new introduction by F. Rosen, and an interpretive essay by H.L.A. Hart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  10. ———. 1997. De l’ontologie et autre texts sur les fictions, English text ed. Philip Schofield, French trans. and comm. Jean-Pierre Cléro and Christian Laval. Paris: Editions du Seuil.Google Scholar
  11. Bix, Brian. 1999. H.L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal Theory. SMU Law Review 52: 167–199.Google Scholar
  12. Bowring, John, ed. 1838–1843. Works of Jeremy Bentham, 11 vols. Edinburgh: W. Tait.Google Scholar
  13. Broome, John. 2000. Normative Requirements. Normativity. Ed. Jonathan Dancy, 78–99. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  14. Campbell, Tom. 1996. The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism. Aldershot: Dartmouth.Google Scholar
  15. ———. 2001b. Tort Law and Tort Theory: Preliminary Reflections on Method. In Philosophy and the Law of Torts. Ed. Gerald J. Postema, 183–213. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. ———. 1996. Legal Positivism. In A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Ed. Dennis Patterson, 241–60. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  17. Delacroix, Silvie. 2004. Hart’s and Kelsen’s Concepts of Normativity Contrasted. Ratio Juris 17: 501–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. ———. 2007. Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule? Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 27: 373–402.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. ———. 1978. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  20. ———. 1986. Law’s Empire. Cambridge, MA: Belnap.Google Scholar
  21. ———. 1996c. Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25: 87–139.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Dyson, R.W., ed. and trans. 2002. St. Thomas Aquinas, Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  23. ———. 1973. Revolutions and the Continuity of Law. In Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Second Series. Ed. A.W.B. Simpson, 44–76. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  24. ———. 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  25. ———. 1998. Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  26. ———. 1940. Law in Quest of Itself. Boston: Beacon.Google Scholar
  27. ———. 1958. Positivism and the Fidelity to Law. Harvard Law Review 71: 630–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Fuller, Lon L. and William R. Perdue. 1936–1937. The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages. Yale Law Journal 46: 52–96, 373–420.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Gardner, John. 2001. Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths. The American Journal of Jurisprudence 46: 199–227.Google Scholar
  30. ———. 1987b. Legal Theory and the Problem of Sense: Comment. In Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy. Ed. Ruth Gavison, 21–34. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  31. ———. 1989b. Rationality and Salience. Philosophical Studies 55: 223–39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. ———. 1985. Authority and Convention. Philosophical Quarterly 35: 329–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. ———. 1996. The Concept of Law Revisited. Michigan Law Review 94: 1687–717.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. ———. 1999. Positivism and Conventionalism. Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 12: 35–52.Google Scholar
  35. Green, T.H. 1889–1890. Works, 3 vols. Ed. R.L. Nettleship. London: Longmans, Green.Google Scholar
  36. Greenawalt, Kent. 1988. Hart’s Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Ratio Juris 1: 40–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Hacker, P.M.S. 1973. Sanction Theories of Duty. In Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Second Series. Ed. A.W.B. Simpson, 131–70. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  38. Hacker, P.M.S. and J. Raz., eds. 1977. Law, Morality, and Society. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  39. ———. 1954. Introduction to John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, vii-xxi. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.Google Scholar
  40. ———. 1955b. Review of Hägerström’s Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morality. Philosophy 30: 369–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. ———. 1957. Analytical Jurisprudence in the Mid-Twentieth Century: A Reply to Professor Bodenheimer. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 105: 953–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. ———. 1958. Legal and Moral Obligation. In Essays in Moral Philosophy. Ed. Abraham Melden, 82–107. Seattle: University of Washington Press.Google Scholar
  43. ———. 1963. Law, Liberty, and Morality. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  44. ———. 1968. Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  45. ———. 1982. Essays on Bentham. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  46. ———. 1983. Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  47. ———. 1994. The Concept of Law. 2nd ed. with Postscript. Ed. Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz. Oxford: Clarendon. (1st ed. 1961.)Google Scholar
  48. ———. 1996. Bentham’s Principle of Utility and Theory of Penal Law. In Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Ed. J.H. Burns and H.L.A. Hart, lxxixcxii. Introd. Fred Rosen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (1st ed. 1982.)Google Scholar
  49. Hart, Jenifer. 1998. Ask Me No More: An Autobiography. London: Peter Halban.Google Scholar
  50. ———. 1988, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism. Ed. W.W. Bartley III. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  51. ———. 2001. Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning. Ed. David Campbell and Philip Thomas. Introd. Nigel Simmonds. Aldershot: Ashgate/Dartmouth. (Essays contained in this volume originally published 1913, 1917.)Google Scholar
  52. Holton, Richard. 1998. Positivism and the Internal Point of View. Law and Philosophy 17: 597–625.Google Scholar
  53. Hume, David. 1985. Of the Original Contract. In Essays Moral, Political, and Literary. Ed. Eugene F. Miller, 465–87. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.Google Scholar
  54. ———. 2000. A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  55. ———. 1967. The Pure Theory of Law. Trans. Max Knight. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  56. Kramer, Matthew. 1999. In Defense of Legal Positivism: Law Without Trimmings. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  57. Lacey, Nicola. 2004. A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  58. Latham, R.T.E. 1949. The Law and the Commonwealth. London: Oxford University Press. (Facsimile of essay first published in 1937.)Google Scholar
  59. Lewis, David. 1969. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
  60. ———. 1984. Ethics and the Rule of Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  61. ———. 1987. Comment. In Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of H.L.A. Hart. Ed. Ruth Gavison, 114–26. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  62. ———. 1981. H.L.A. Hart. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
  63. ———. 1985. A Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law? Valparaiso University Law Review 20: 3–41.Google Scholar
  64. ———. 1987. Comment. In Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of H.L.A. Hart. Ed. Ruth Gavison, 104–13. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  65. ———. 1996. The Concept of Law and The Concept of Law. In The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism. Ed. Robert P. George, 163–93. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  66. ———. 2006b. Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 26: 683–704.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  67. Marshall, Geoffrey. 1957. Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Commonwealth. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  68. Mill, John Stuart. 1998 Utilitarianism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (1st ed. 1863.)Google Scholar
  69. ———. 2000. Educating Oneself in Public. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  70. Murphy, Liam. 2001. The Political Question of the Concept of Law. In Hart’s Postscript. Ed. Jules Coleman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 371–409.Google Scholar
  71. ———. 1995. Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory. In Law and Interpretation. Ed. Andrei Marmor. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  72. ———. 2000. Holmes versus Hart: The Bad Man in Legal Theory. In The Path of Law and Its Influence: The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes. Ed. Stephen J. Burton, 158–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  73. ———. 2001. Hart’s Methodological Positivism. In Hart’s Postscript. Ed. Jules Coleman, 311–54. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  74. ———. 2007. Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of View. Fordham Law Review 75: 1171–209.Google Scholar
  75. ———. 1982. Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law. Journal of Legal Studies 11: 165–203.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  76. ———. 2010b. Positivism and the Separation of Realists from their Skepticism: Normative Guidance, the Rule of Law, and Legal Reasoning. In The Hart-Fuller Debate in the 21st Century. Ed. Peter Cane, 259–79. Oxford: Hart.Google Scholar
  77. Radbruch, Gustav. 1946. Gestezliches Recht und übergesetzliches Recht. Süddeutschen Juristen- Zeitung 1: 105–8.Google Scholar
  78. Raz, Joseph. 1973. On the Functions of Law. In Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Second Series. Ed. A.W.B. Simpson, 278–304. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  79. ———. 1979. The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  80. ———. 1981. The Purity of the Pure Theory. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 35: 441–59.Google Scholar
  81. ———. 2001b. Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison. In Hart’s Postscript, Ed. Jules Coleman, 1–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  82. Ross, Alf. 1958. On Law and Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  83. ———. 1991b. Rules and the Rule of Law. Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 14: 645–94.Google Scholar
  84. ———. 1998. Positivism Through Thick and Thin. In Analyzing Law Ed. Brian Bix, 65–78. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  85. ———. 2000. The Bad Man and the Internal Point of View. In The Path of Law and Its Influence: The Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes. Ed. Stephen J. Burton, 197–209. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  86. ———. 2002b. Law, Plans, and Practical Reason. Legal Theory 8: 387–441.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  87. ———. 2007. What is the Internal Point of View? Fordham Law Review 75: 1157–70.Google Scholar
  88. ———. 2007. Law as a Moral Idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  89. ———. 2001. Hart’s Semantics. In Hart’s Postscript. Ed. Jules Coleman, 59–98. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  90. Tapper, Colin. 1973. Powers and Secondary Rules of Change. In Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Second Series. Ed. A.W.B. Simpson, 242–77. Oxford: Clarendon.Google Scholar
  91. Thompson, E.P. 1976. Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act. New York: Pantheon Books.Google Scholar
  92. ———. 1985b. Talk About Realism. New York University Law Review 60: 329–84.Google Scholar
  93. ———. 2001. Normative (or Ethical) Positivism. In Hart’s Postscript. Ed. Jules Coleman, 410–33. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  94. ———. 2002. Legal and Political Philosophy. In The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law. Ed. Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro, 352–81. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  95. ———. 2009d. Who Needs Rules of Recognition? In The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution. Ed. Matthew Adler and Kenneth Himma, 327–49. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  96. Williams, Glanville. 1945. International Law and the Controversy Concerning the Word “Law”. British Yearbook of International Law 22: 146–63.Google Scholar
  97. ———. 1945–1946. Language and the Law. Law Quarterly Review 61: 71–86; 179–95; 293–303; 384–406; 62:387–406.Google Scholar
  98. Zipursky, Benjamin. 2001. The Model of Social Facts. In Hart’s Postscript. Ed. Jules Coleman, 219–70. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  99. ———. 2006. Legal Obligations and the Internal Aspect of Rules. Fordham Law Review 75: 1229–53.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerald J. Postema
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of North CarolinaChapel Hill NorthUSA

Personalised recommendations