The Distinctive Philosophical Content of the Concept of an “anima mundi” in Leibniz and His Followers. Arguments of This School Against the General Theory of anima mundi. A Broader Natural Philosophical and Metaphysical Discussion of Their Answer Positions
As we have mentioned, then, the main argument against the world soul in Leibniz’s De ipsa natura is that it is superfluous, praeter necessitatem, to posit it: a carefully formulated natural philosophical theory can, suggests Leibniz, supply us with a more reasonable explanation of how the natural world is governed by God than the hypothesis of the world soul. Therefore, the main drift of this text is to show (on the ground of the implicit logical principle entia praeter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda) that a qualified monotheism is a methodologically simpler solution for thinking the divine direction of the world, so no direct argument against the anima universi is necessary.