Kutz on Collective Intentional Activities. Building an Alternative Model: Groups Which Act with No Normative Unity

Abstract

Since there are several reasons for thinking that the nature of legal practice could be explained by using a model of collective intentional action, this chapter focuses on a theory of collective activities proposed by Kutz. There are several difficulties with his model, nevertheless. In particular, it also seems that it is uninformatively circular. But this objection can be overcome by introducing some clarifications. An alternative model is then proposed. It captures the simplest instances of collective intentional activities. Some are, however, less simple. They are such that participants conceive of themselves as under a duty qua members of the group. The author labels them “the activities of groups with a normative unity”, and distinguishes between two possible sub variants: those where the fact that members conceive of themselves as under a duty qua members depends on their thinking that the group-activity is particularly valuable in relation to individuals other than themselves (“the activities of groups with a normative unity of type (I)”), and those where members think that they are under such duty even if they do not think that the group-activity is actually valuable in that way (“the activities of groups with a normative unity of type (II)”). The alternative model does not capture them, but it could be expanded to do so. The point is important, for there is reason to think that some institutional practices in general, and legal practice in particular, are instances of the activity of groups with a normative unity.