Horizontal-Intention: Time, Genesis, History – Husserl’s Understanding of Their Immanent Relationship
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In the first part, the author will discuss Husserl’s understanding of “time” and “genesis” in the Logical Investigations (around 1900), and the possible relation of “time” and “genesis”, though in that work Husserl himself did not put the two into any kind of relationship – not even one of opposition. Only through some fragmental statements can we realize Husserl’s focus on “analyses of time” and his exclusion of “analyses of genesis”. In the second part, the author will represent Husserl’s attitude toward the analysis of “time” and “genesis” in the Lectures (around 1917). Unlike the period of the Logical Investigations, Husserl discussed these themes together in the lectures, and he tried to grasp their immanent relationship. Part Three discusses Husserl’s thought of “time” and “genesis” in the period of the Cartesian Meditations (around 1928). This thought in his manuscripts in 1921 found its expression in a discussion of the relationship between static phenomenology, which takes “transverse intentionality” (Querintentionalität) as its theme, and genetic phenomenology, which takes “horizontal intentionality” (Längsintentionalität) as its theme. It is likely that this thought led Husserl to consider “time” as “the universal form of all geneses of egology” in the Cartesian Meditations. Starting from here, in the fourth part, the historical dimension came into Husserl’s horizon. First and foremost, the historical dimension concerns the way and the sphere in which history is studied, i.e., studies of the universal form of history and the constitution of history for the ego. The fifth part is a further investigation of Husserlian phenomenology of history, especially clarifying the immanent relationship between history, time and genesis in Husserl’s late thought. This part also includes a general review of the theory and practice of his phenomenology of history, and the possible connection and difference between the “form” and “content” of his phenomenology of history.