Abstract
Approximately 800,000 shipments of hazardous materials (hazmat) move daily through the U.S. transportation system [41] and approximately one truck in five on U.S. highways is carrying some form of hazardous material [40]. The modeling tools that have been developed over the last 30 years for the identification of routes and schedules for hazmat shipments emphasize the tradeoffs between cost minimization to the shipper and carrier and controlling the “natural” consequences that would stem from an accident. As the terrorist threat has grown, it has become clear that a new perspective, which allows for the representation of the goals and activities of terrorists, must be incorporated into these routing and scheduling models. This paper develops a non–cooperative two–person non–zero sum game to represent the interaction of the shipper/carrier and the terrorist for the movement of hazardous materials. It also develops an effective solution procedure for this game. Finally, it illustrates the methodology on a realistic case study.
Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.
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Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge Dr. Charles Audet at École Polytechnique Montréal for providing the code needed for comparison purposes. Also this material is based upon work supported by Sandia National Laboratories. This funding is gratefully acknowledged but it implies no endorsement of the findings.
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Dadkar, Y., Nozick, L., Jones, D. (2010). Routing of Hazardous Material Shipments Under the Threat of Terrorist Attack. In: Bell, M., Hosseinloo, S., Kanturska, U. (eds) Security and Environmental Sustainability of Multimodal Transport. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8563-4_6
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