Abstract
In this final chapter, I would like to consider several possible objections to the view defended in the previous pages. Some of these objections will look somewhat familiar: in a sense, they are old objections, or at least new versions of old objections. Some of these objections are somewhat new, and require extending or applying previous claims and arguments to different situations. Some objections relate to my methodology. Some objections relate to my treatment of specific cases. Some objections relate to both. My treatment here will attempt to begin with a methodological objection, and will progress into specific cases to emerge as illustrations of the methodology.
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Notes
- 1.
See Beauchamp and Childress (2008, Chapter 10).
- 2.
The President’s Council on Bioethics (2009).
- 3.
The President’s Council on Bioethics (2009, pp. 79–80).
- 4.
The President’s Council on Bioethics (2009, p. 83).
- 5.
The President’s Council on Bioethics (2009, pp. 83–84).
- 6.
The President’s Council on Bioethics (2009, p. 84).
- 7.
The President’s Council on Bioethics (2009, p. 19).
- 8.
The President’s Council on Bioethics (2009, pp. 29–30).
- 9.
The President’s Council on Bioethics (2009, pp. 31).
- 10.
The President’s Council on Bioethics (2009, p. 17).
- 11.
First, however, consider an initial objection. It is sometimes claimed that Near-Death Experiences necessarily involve experiences of a person who has not died—otherwise these experience would not be called Near-Death experiences. I believe this claim can be resisted by reflecting on how death itself is regularly thought of as being like a boundary. One can be near to a boundary by being close to it on either side of it, or even on the boundary itself. For example, if I am traveling by car, and I call my wife on a cell phone to tell her that I am “near” the Indiana-Ohio border, this by itself does not tell her which side of the border I am on. Or consider the boundary of the California shoreline where the land meets the water. One can be “near” this boundary whether one is on the land or in the water (or both). A ship captain telling his crew not to steer “too near” the land, and a father telling his toddler not to walk “too near” the water, are both speaking of a state of being “near” the shoreline—just from different directions. Near death experiences, then, should be thought of as those experiences had by persons close to the boundary of death, on either side of that boundary (if there is more than one side), or even at the moment of death. If one has had a near death experience, this still leaves open the question of whether one actually died.
- 12.
Neuhaus (1984).
- 13.
Neuhaus (2000, pp. 31–32).
- 14.
The anthology, edited by John Donnelly, is Language, Metaphysics, and Death (2nd edition; New York: Fordham University Press, 1994), and Ayer’s article is on pp. 226–236. All page references which follow refer to this reprinting of Ayer’s article. Note, the first of the two pieces, in addition to being printed in The Spectator, was also published in the National Review. See Ayer (1988, pp. 38–40).
- 15.
Ayer (1994, pp. 228–229).
- 16.
Ayer (1994, p. 229).
- 17.
Ayer (1994, p. 229).
- 18.
Parnia and Fenwick (2002).
- 19.
Parnia and Fenwick (2002, p. 8).
- 20.
Parnia and Fenwick (2002, p. 10).
- 21.
Parnia and Fenwick (2002, p. 10).
- 22.
Van Lommel et al. (2001, p. 2041).
- 23.
Van Lommel et al. (2001, p. 2043).
- 24.
Van Lommel et al. (2001, p. 2044).
- 25.
Van Lommel et al. (2001, p. 2044).
- 26.
Some of the correspondence was serious, and some was whimsical. For example, the following humorous letter from Doctor Richard Couper echoes A. J. Ayer’s response to his first Near-Death Experience:
Sir—Pim van Lommel and colleagues’ study reminds me of an apocryphal comment attributed to Kerry Packer, Australia’s wealthiest man. Packer had a myocardial infarction while riding a polo pony. A nearby ambulance crew resuscitated him. Packer reported his experience with the telling comment: “Mate, I tell you there is nothing there”. He was obviously not keen to repeat the experience and promptly equipped the New South Wales ambulance service with defibrillators…It is a pity that Kerry Packer, who, in his rare public utterances tells it as he sees it, could offer no further insight into the presence of the human soul” (Couper, 2002, p. 2116).
- 27.
In this and what follows, I shall try to speak in terms of a (disembodied) “self” rather than a (disembodied) “soul”, since I wish to avoid an intramural debate about whether you are your soul: even if you think that you are not your soul, you can agree that you, yourself (i.e., your “self”), can survive in a disembodied state.
- 28.
The President’s Council on Bioethics (2009, p. 110).
- 29.
George and Tollefsen (2008).
- 30.
George and Tollefsen (2008, p. 50), emphasis mine. The same passage is found, almost verbatim, in Lee and George’s (2004) article. The only interesting difference for our purposes is that the 2004 article uses the phrase “The human embryo…is fully programmed actively to develop himself or herself…” (p. 14), while the 2008 book uses the phrase “The human embryo…is fully programmed and has the active disposition to use that information to develop himself or herself…” (emphasis mine in both cases).
- 31.
George and Tollefsen (2008, pp. 50–51).
- 32.
George and Tollefsen (2008, pp. 52, 53), emphasis mine.
- 33.
George and Tollefsen (2008, p. 53), emphasis mine.
- 34.
George and Tollefsen (2008, p. 54).
- 35.
George and Tollefsen (2008, pp. 54–55), emphasis mine. The 2004 article by Lee and George has a parallel passage emphasizing active dispositions: “Nor are human embryos comparable to somatic cells (such as skin cells or muscle cells), though some have tried to argue that they are. Like sex cells, a somatic cell is functionally only a part of a larger organism. The human embryo, by contrast, possesses from the beginning the internal resources and active disposition to develop himself or herself to full maturity; all he or she needs is a suitable environment and nutrition. The direction of his or her growth is not extrinsically determined, but the embryo is internally directing his or her growth toward full maturity” (Lee and George, 2004).
- 36.
As indicated in Chapter 1, Tollefsen has indicated to me (in correspondence) that he would prefer to make a distinction between dispositions—which, on his proposal, are potentialities that can be possessed by all manner of things—and capacities—which, on his proposal seem to be dispositions of living things. However, as I indicated earlier, I am reluctant to adopt Tollefsen’s proposal here. Both philosophical usage and common usage of the dispositional family of terms is highly variable. Therefore, I think it remains preferable to stick with my stipulation that I will be using all such dispositional terms as synonymous with “capacities”, and that I will mark distinctions among capacities by adding extra terms like “active” and “passive”. I believe that simply keeping this difference between Tollefsen and me in mind will go some way towards properly framing the extent of our debate over the issue of active and passive capacities.
- 37.
George and Tollefsen (2008, p. 86).
- 38.
Aristotle (1941, 1046a26-28).
- 39.
Aristotle (1941, 1046a22-26).
- 40.
Aristotle (1941, 1046a12-14).
- 41.
If one prefers, the last sentence of this paragraph could focus on just half of the stuff in the pre-fission organism: the capacity of the organic stuff in the left-hand side of the pre-fission organism is an active capacity to constitute one post-fission organism, but this capacity is not an identity-preserving capacity because the organic stuff is not literally numerically identical to the post-fission organism (constitution is not the same relation as identity). And the same goes for the right-hand side of the pre-fission organism.
- 42.
Gomez-Lobo (2009, p. 7).
- 43.
Gomez-Lobo (2009), Footnote 41, pp. 21–22.
- 44.
But especially Christopher Tollefsen, in personal correspondence.
- 45.
For an overview of one way of incorporating casuistical approaches into an overall methodology in bioethics, see Beauchamp and Childress (2008, Chapter 10).
- 46.
The President’s Council on Bioethics (2005, p. 37).
- 47.
The President’s Council on Bioethics (2005, p. 38).
- 48.
Committee on Doctrine, National Conference of Catholic Bishops (1996).
- 49.
Thanks are due to an anonymous reviewer for being one of my more forceful, clear, and charitable critics on this particular point. I owe the wording in the text largely to this reviwer’s formulation of the objection.
- 50.
Benedict Ashley (2009).
- 51.
Benedict Ashley (2009)
- 52.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for really pushing me with this objection.
- 53.
Benedict Ashley (2009)
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DiSilvestro, R. (2010). Old Objections and New Directions: Capacities and Moral Status at the Very Borders of Human Life. In: Human Capacities and Moral Status. Philosophy and Medicine(), vol 108. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8537-5_6
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