Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Also: Humans, Our Capacities, and the Powers We Share

Part of the Philosophy and Medicine book series (PHME, volume 108)


In this chapter, I defend the first step of the main argument: if something is human, it has a set of typical human capacities. A more precise way of putting this step is as follows: there is some set, H, of capacities, such that for any individual X, if X is human, then X has H. I defend this step in the face of three main problem areas: the obvious diversity of capacities among normal humans, the nebulous sense in which undeveloped humans have capacities, and the apparent absence of certain capacities among abnormal humans.

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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyCalifornia State University, SacramentoSacramentoUSA

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