Passivity and Self-temporalization

  • Victor Biceaga
Part of the Contributions To Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 60)


For a number of reasons, no phenomenological account of the distinction between activity and passivity can afford to sidestep the question of internal time-consciousness which, in Husserl’s view, ranks among “the most difficult of all phenomenological problems.”1 First, temporal syntheses fall within the compass of the passive sphere. Second, as both active and passive synthetic accomplishments are grounded in temporal syntheses, the former can only be understood within the framework provided by the latter. Third, Husserl’s account of time-constituting consciousness ‘sublates’ pairs of opposites, such as form/content and constituting/constituted, and invites a similar reconsideration of the relation between activity and passivity.


Temporal Synthesis Subjective Time Temporal Object Absolute Flow Lunar Eclipse 
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  1. Sauvanet, Pierre. 2000. Le Rythme et la raison. Paris: Kimé.Google Scholar
  2. Zahavi, Dan. 1998. Self-awareness and affection. In Alterity and faciticity, ed. Natalie Depraz, and Dan Zahavi. Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Nipissing UniversityNorth BayCanada

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