Abstract
In Chapter 6, we saw the theoretical problems with critique as a method of historical inquiry. The foundational assumptions are such that the observations necessary to establish a master key for interpreting human behavior are just not possible. In Chapters 7 and 8 we saw the way critique’s theoretical problems manifest themselves in actual historical inquiry in such a way as to have concerning moral implications as well as to present a serious obstacle to resolving political conflict. Because critique involves identifying both the victims of false consciousness and the villains responsible for its perpetration, when employed in the attempt to understand the present, logical entailments of critique include taking paternalistic and prosecutorial action. By attributing false consciousness to the subjects of his inquiry, the critic denies the validity of their stories as well as the validity of the language they use to describe their world and their place in it. Thus the critic precludes any understanding of the subjects themselves and therefore removes any possibility of making arguments in terms that might be compelling to these persons.
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Notes
- 1.
I might, for example, represent Said’s book as an example of literary criticism. The concepts of “book” and “literary criticism” are embedded in my language and culture and its institutions. To see that this is the case, imagine a person living before the printing press, or prior to the practice of academic criticism. That these concepts would not be available to such a person does nothing to diminish the truth of my representation. Said seems to be assuming that unless we can describe particulars as participating in something like Platonic forms we have no legitimate basis for using universal names.
- 2.
“Essentialism, Consistency and Islam: A Critique of Edward Said’s Orientalism” Irfan Khawaja. Khawaja’s article is a thorough and devastating demonstration of Said’s inconsistencies and logical contradictions, to repeat more of his argument here would be unnecessary.
- 3.
This term is Charles Taylor’s.
- 4.
Bernard Williams describes this as the idea of the “characterless self”. He writes, “That idea is implicit in the aspiration to a total critique. If the aspiration makes sense, then the criticizing self can be separated from everything that a person contingently is – in itself, the criticizing self is simply the perspective of reason or morality”.
- 5.
This system certainly is not “egalitarian” in a sense familiar to most Western readers. Importantly, for example, women are often not recognized as equals to men. The system is egalitarian just in the sense that no individuals have higher office than another; none are given official power or authority over others, as, in the West, police are given authority to use force, judges are given authority to sentence criminals, and so on.
- 6.
“Authority” here should be understood as official, that is, as a function of office, as opposed to age, or wisdom, or some characteristic that might qualify one as an authority in a different sense.
- 7.
This should not be taken as implying that these tribal systems are not also either potentially, or in fact, despotic or abusive. The significance of this point is simply to remind those in the West who have been fortunate enough to live in times of freedom and prosperity under the protection of representative governments that, historically speaking, such states are the exceptions rather than the norm. One should not, therefore, expect that any rational person would prefer the state system to that of self-help.
- 8.
I do not intend here to suggest that the modern state is the sole factor responsible for this conception of the individual or its flourishing. To the contrary, the development of this conception has a long and complicated history that involves religious, artistic, technological, and economic factors. The modern state is itself a product of these factors and more. Nonetheless, the state has, as I say, provided the space for this conception to flourish and has, through its laws and practices, cultivated it and pushed rival conceptions to the periphery.
- 9.
Hannah Arendt puts the same point thusly, “To think, with Hegel, that truth resides and reveals itself in the time-process itself is characteristic of all modern consciousness, however it expresses itself, in specifically Hegelian terms or not”. “The Concept of History” in Between Past and Future. New York: Penguin Books USA, 1993.
- 10.
Article 1 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights states “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in spirit of brotherhood”. Article 26 lists the right to free education, the early years of which is to be compulsory, and decrees, “Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality”. The European Union Constitution explains in its preamble that, “the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity… It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice”. (emphasis added)
- 11.
What empirical data might we gather, for example, that would demonstrate equality, or allow us to identify and distinguish between accidental and essential properties of personhood? I do not raise this question to dispute the reality or the goodness of human equality, but instead to note that because such equality has not been, nor could it be, established empirically, Fukuyama’s contention that rationality demands recognition of this equality needs argument. My contention here is that the attempt to establish this equality by deriving it from the nature of freedom (and thereby attempt to side-step the challenge of providing a metaphysical basis of equality) is a clever move but depends on a specific conception of freedom that itself is in need of support.
- 12.
http://www.un.org/events/humanrights/2007/udhr.shtml. February 10, 2009.
- 13.
EU Constitution, p. 18.
- 14.
I take these claims by the UN and EU to be empirical claims. That is, though they may also be understood as normative – stating that these values ought to be universally embraced – they are presented as observations about what rights are “nowadays” actually valued. (In fact, I take it that these empirical observations are proffered as enhancing the legitimacy of these bodies and as evidence that they are not “imposing” these values on peoples who do not embrace them.) The fact that not all cultures really do embrace these values is evidence that they are not universal. Of course, were these claims of universality merely normative, the fact that not all cultures embrace the values in question would not serve as counterevidence to these claims.
- 15.
“Subordination” here does not necessarily include showing respect or honor to others, nor does it necessarily preclude following another’s lead. Salzman explains, “Subordination is regarded as a loss of manhood, as manhood and manly virtues – assertiveness, strength, courage, tenacity, endurance, and capability – are equated with honor… in any confrontation, conflict, or combat, honor comes with victory and shame comes with defeat”.
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Noland, J.R. (2010). Freeing Anthropology from Critique. In: Imagination and Critique. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 19. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3804-3_9
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