The Moral Significance of Merely Possible Persons

Chapter
Part of the Philosophy and Medicine book series (PHME, volume 107)

Abstract

2.1.1 It is a matter of dispute whether persons who count as existing or future, relative to a particular circumstance, or possible future or world, have a moral status that merely possible persons lack. Are persons who do or will exist the only persons who matter morally? Are they the only persons whose needs and interests we must take into account in calculating what we ought to do? Can only their losses bear oncount against – the permissibility of acts that impose those losses? Can only their losses, in a roundabout way, count in favor of alternative acts that avoid those losses?

Keywords

Significant Loss Actual World Wellbeing Level Moral Significance Pareto Principle 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and ReligionCollege of New JerseyEwingUSA

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