Abstract
The rule of law has a long history in the aspirations of oppressed peoples everywhere1. Developing societies seek to establish the rule of law, well-regulated societies seek to preserve it, and most governments claim to maintain it, whatever the nature of their actual practices2. This makes the rule of law a nearly universal value, endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly, for example, which has repeatedly identified “human rights, the rule of law and democracy” as “universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United Nations.”3 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved by the Assembly without dissent, recognized that “…it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the Rule of Law.”4 These ringing assertions, repeated or paraphrased by the European Convention on Human Rights5 the American Convention on Human Rights,6 the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights7 and numerous other regional agreements and national constitutions,8 illustrate the necessary moral component always present in appeals to the “rule of law.” The “rule of law” in its usual sense implies the fulfillment of justice and the negation of government by and for the benefit of those in charge.9
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Notes
- 1.
On the history and philosophy of the Rule of Law, see Costa, Pietro and Zolo, Danilo, The Rule of Law: History, Theory and Criticism (Dordrecht, 2007) and Tamanaha, Brian Z., On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge, 2004).
- 2.
See, e.g., Constitution of Russia Article 1; Interview with Dmitry Medvedev, President of Russia, Financial Times, 24 March, 2008
- 3.
See, e.g., U.N.G.A. /RES/61/39, 18 December, 2006, on “The rule of law at the national and international levels.” Cf. A/RES/62/70; A/RES/63/128.
- 4.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (December 10, 1948), Preamble.
- 5.
The European Convention on Human Rights (4 November, 1950), Preamble.
- 6.
The American Convention on Human Rights (22 November, 1969), Articles 8 and 9.
- 7.
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (June 27, 1981), Articles 3, 6, and 7.
- 8.
For example, the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 5.
- 9.
See, for example, Aristoteles, Politika III, 1287a, associating the rule of law with the rule of reason.
- 10.
The famous story of the decemviri and the struggle for the rule of law in Rome was told by Livy in the third book of his History (Ab urbe condita III. 33ff). For similar developments in Athens, see Martin Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law (Berkeley, 1986).
- 11.
See, e.g., Marcus Tullius Cicero, De re publica III.xxii.33. Cf. Aristoteles, supra note 9.
- 12.
This insight was famously expressed by Marcus Tullius Cicero, De legibus 1.vii.23: “inter quos etiam ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est: quae cum sit lex” on the importance of this famous insight, see M.N.S. Sellers, “The Influence of Marcus Tullius Cicero on Modern Legal and Political Ideas,” to appear in Ciceroniana, Colloquium Tullianum Anni MMVIII (2009).
- 13.
John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (London, 1787) at I.128.
- 14.
See, e.g., Titus Livius, Ab urbe condita, 2.I.I.
- 15.
See e.g. James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge, 1992), p. 20.
- 16.
See the other chapters of this volume for examples in a variety of cultures and continents.
- 17.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London, 1651), at I.vi.24; I.xiii.63.
- 18.
Ibid. at II. xxx.175.
- 19.
Ibid. at II.xviii.90.
- 20.
Ibid. at II.xxvi.93.
- 21.
Ibid. at II.xxvi.137.
- 22.
For the formula “auctoritas, non veritas, facit legem” see the Latin translation of Hobbes in Thomas Hobbes, Opera ed. W. Molesworth (1837–1845) at III.26.202.
- 23.
See, e.g., Carl Friedrich Gerber, Grundzüge eines Systems des deutschen Staatsrechts (Leipzig, 1865).
- 24.
Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 The Monist 285 (1985) at 299. Law exists to “allow those in authority to express a view on how people should behave.”
- 25.
See M.N.S. Sellers, Republican Legal Theory: The History, Constitution and Purposes of Law in a Free State (Basingstoke, 2004).
- 26.
Donato Gianotti, Libro della Republica de’ Viniziani (1540) in F. Diaz (ed.) Opere politiche (Milan, 1974).
- 27.
James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Cambridge, 1992), p. 6.
- 28.
John Adams, A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (London, 1787) at I.126.
- 29.
For an early example of this distinction, see Cornelius Tacitus, ab excessu divi August annalium libri at I.2.
- 30.
See supra note 12.
- 31.
“Publius” [James Madison] The Federalist LI, February 6, 1788.
- 32.
Ibid.
- 33.
Supra notes 13 and 14.
- 34.
John Adams, Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America vol. III (London, 1788) at 505 (Letter VII, December 26, 1787).
- 35.
Ibid., Preface, at I.ii.
- 36.
Ibid.
- 37.
Statutes of the Realm VII, 636f.; 12–13 William III, c.2.
- 38.
See, e.g., Voltaire [François-Marie Arouet], Lettres Philosphiques (1734), Lettre 8, Lettre 9.
- 39.
See, e.g., Alexis de Tocquerille, De la démocratie en Amérique (Paris, 1835, 1840), volume I, part 2, Chapter 8, for how even the elections of judges by the people poses a threat to the rule of law.
- 40.
See M.N.S. Sellers, “The Value and Purpose of Law” 33 Baltimore Law Journal 145 (2004).
- 41.
See the citations to John Adams and Voltaire above. Cf. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (Cambridge, MA, 1999), p. 71.
- 42.
See supra notes 25–28.
- 43.
To use John Adams’ felicitous description. Supra note 12.
- 44.
See ibid. at I.1.
- 45.
For the concept of “necessary” law, see Emerich de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle Appliqués à la conduit et aux affaires des Nations et des Souverains (London, 1758) at Preface pp. xx–xxi. His “voluntary” law is also “necessary,” in the more natural sense of the terminology. Cf. Christian Wolff, Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum (1764).
- 46.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London, 1859) referred to “backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage.”
- 47.
Ibid.
- 48.
And Mill was not shy in spelling these out. Ibid.: “Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians.”
- 49.
See Philip Pettit, Republicansim: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997).
- 50.
John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London, 1861), Chapter III.
- 51.
See James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, MA, 1996).
- 52.
See M.N.S. Sellers, “Republican Impartiality” 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 273 (1991).
- 53.
See, e.g., Aristoteles, Politika IV.2.1 (1289 a 26 ff).
- 54.
So much so that Kant baldy stated that democracy was “im eigentlichen Verstande des Worts notwendig ein Despotismus.” Immanual Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden (1795).
- 55.
“Publius” [James Madison], The Federalist No. LXIII (March 1, 1788).
- 56.
This necessity is well expressed by James Madison (“Publius”) in The Federalist No. 10 (November 22, 1787).
- 57.
John Adams, in the three volumes of his A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (London, 1787–1788) gives numerous examples of the literary and historical antecedents of this way of thinking.
- 58.
To give just one example, the United States still retains popular elections of sitting judges in many States of the Union.
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Sellers, M. (2010). An Introduction to the Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective. In: Sellers, M., Tomaszewski, T. (eds) The Rule of Law in Comparative Perspective. Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol 3. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3749-7_1
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