How Can a Phenomenologist Have a Philosophy of Mathematics?

  • Jaakko Hintikka
Part of the Phaenomenologica book series (PHAE, volume 195)


Husserl’s philosophy of mathematics is interpreted as dealing with forms not unlike Aristotle’s forms. They can be somehow immediately present in one’s consciousness. Husserl’s ideas are compared for similarities and dissimilarities with those of Aristotle, Mach, Russell and Wittgenstein. Husserl’s main development is seen as making these forms more and more robust conceptually. It parallels the overall development of mathematics in the last 200 years from a study of numbers and space into a study of different structures. This development culminates in Husserl’s unfinished project of a theory of all theories. This project has closer connections with Hilbert’s axiomatic theorizing than with the ideas of the intuitionists.


Simple Object Axiom System Phenomenological Theory Axiomatic Theory Minimal Sense 
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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jaakko Hintikka
    • 1
  1. 1.Boston UniversityBostonUSA

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