A Dynamic Scheme for Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocol
Group communication mechanism provides several participants with a secure and credible communication environment by sharing a confidential group key within group members. Group Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (GDH) is an extension of two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Many protocols based on GDH protocol have been proposed, among which AT-GDH protocol is an authenticated group key agreement protocol. AT-GDH2 protocol complements AT-GDH with a dynamic group key updating scheme. This paper proposes an improved dynamic scheme based on AT-GDH after analyzing the security flaws in AT-GDH2 protocol. We name this proposed group key management process as AT-GDH3. Then the security property of AT-GDH3 protocol is analyzed using the strand space and authentication test theory from the aspects of authentication, implicit key authentication, recency, backward security and forward security. The results show that AT-GDH3 protocol can overcome the security flaws in AT-GDH2 protocol, and can guarantee security properties of group key management.
KeywordsAuthentication test Authenticated group key agreement protocol Group communication protocol Strand space
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- M.Steiner,G.Tsudik,M.Waidner, Diffie-Hellman key distribution extended to group communication, In SIGSAC Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.(1996)31–37.Google Scholar
- M. Steiner, G. Tsudik, M. Waidner, CLIQUES: A new approach to group key agreement, In Proceedings of IEEE ICDCS’97. (1997)380–387.Google Scholar
- Y. Kim, A. Perrig, G. Tsudik, Communication-efficient group key agreement, In Proceedings of IFIP-SEC.(2001)229–244.Google Scholar
- O. Pereira, Modelling and security analysis of authenticated group key agreement protocols, PhD thesis,Universite catholique de Louvain, 2003.Google Scholar
- Li li, Research on formal analysis and authentication technology of security protocol, PhD thesis, Wuhan university,2004.Google Scholar
- F.Fabrega, J.Herzeg, J.Guttman, Strand spaces: why is a security protocol correct, In Proceedings of the 1998 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. (1998)160–171.Google Scholar
- J.Guttman, Security protocol design via authentication tests, In Proceedings of the 15th Computer Security Foundations Workshop, (2002)92–10.Google Scholar