Advertisement

A Dynamic Scheme for Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocol

Conference paper

Abstract

Group communication mechanism provides several participants with a secure and credible communication environment by sharing a confidential group key within group members. Group Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (GDH) is an extension of two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Many protocols based on GDH protocol have been proposed, among which AT-GDH protocol is an authenticated group key agreement protocol. AT-GDH2 protocol complements AT-GDH with a dynamic group key updating scheme. This paper proposes an improved dynamic scheme based on AT-GDH after analyzing the security flaws in AT-GDH2 protocol. We name this proposed group key management process as AT-GDH3. Then the security property of AT-GDH3 protocol is analyzed using the strand space and authentication test theory from the aspects of authentication, implicit key authentication, recency, backward security and forward security. The results show that AT-GDH3 protocol can overcome the security flaws in AT-GDH2 protocol, and can guarantee security properties of group key management.

Keywords

Authentication test Authenticated group key agreement protocol Group communication protocol Strand space 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. [1]
    S. Rafaeli, D. Hutchison, A Survey of Key Management for Secure Group Communication, ACM Computing Surveys. 35(2003)309–329.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. [2]
    Y. Amir, Y. Kim, C.Nita-Rotaru, G.Tsudik, On the Performance of Group Key Agreement Protocols, ACM Transactions on Information and System Security. 7(2004)457–488.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. [3]
    W.Diffie,M.E.Hellman, New directions in cryptography,IEEE Trans. on Information Theory. 22(1976)644–654.MATHCrossRefMathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  4. [4]
    M.Steiner,G.Tsudik,M.Waidner, Diffie-Hellman key distribution extended to group communication, In SIGSAC Proceedings of the 3rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security.(1996)31–37.Google Scholar
  5. [5]
    M. Just, S. Vaudenay, Authenticated multi-party key agreement, In Advances in Cryptology-Proceedings of AsiaCrypt.1163(1996)36–49.MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  6. [6]
    M. Steiner, G. Tsudik, M. Waidner, CLIQUES: A new approach to group key agreement, In Proceedings of IEEE ICDCS’97. (1997)380–387.Google Scholar
  7. [7]
    W. G. Tzeng, A practical and secure fault-tolerant conference key agreement protocol, In Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC’00. 1751(2000)1–13.MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  8. [8]
    E. Bresson, O. Chevassut, D. Pointcheval, Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange - the dynamic case, In Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of AsiaCrypt. 2248(2001)290–309.MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  9. [9]
    Y. Kim, A. Perrig, G. Tsudik, Communication-efficient group key agreement, In Proceedings of IFIP-SEC.(2001)229–244.Google Scholar
  10. [10]
    E. Bresson, O. Chevassut, D. Pointcheval, Dynamic group Diffie-Hellman key exchange under standard assumptions, In Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of Eurocrypt. 2332(2002)321–336.MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  11. [11]
    E. Bresson, O. Chevassut, D. Pointcheval, Group Diffie-Hellman key exchange secure against dictionary attacks, In Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of AsiaCrypt. 2501(2002)497–514.MathSciNetGoogle Scholar
  12. [12]
    Y. Kim, A. Perrig, G. Tsudik, Tree-based group key agreement, ACM Transactions on Information and System Security(TISSEC).7(2004), 60–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. [13]
    O. Pereira, Modelling and security analysis of authenticated group key agreement protocols, PhD thesis,Universite catholique de Louvain, 2003.Google Scholar
  14. [14]
    Li li, Research on formal analysis and authentication technology of security protocol, PhD thesis, Wuhan university,2004.Google Scholar
  15. [15]
    F.Fabrega, J.Herzeg, J.Guttman, Strand spaces: why is a security protocol correct, In Proceedings of the 1998 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. (1998)160–171.Google Scholar
  16. [16]
    J.Guttman, Security protocol design via authentication tests, In Proceedings of the 15th Computer Security Foundations Workshop, (2002)92–10.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.State Key Laboratory Of Information SecurityGraduate University Of Chinese, Academy Of SciencesBeijingP.R.China
  2. 2.School of Information Security EngineeringShanghai Jiao Tong University, National Engineering Center of Information SecurityShanghaiP.R.China
  3. 3.School of SoftwareShanghai Jiao Tong UniversityShanghaiP.R.China

Personalised recommendations