Abstract
Each Internet communication leaves trails here or there, that can be followed back to the user. Notably, anonymous communication schemes are purposed to hide users’ identity as to personal, source and destination location and content information. Previous studies have shown that the average round trip times (RTT) leakage between network host location, X1 and network destination location, Y1, can be determined, [12]. Additionally, an attack from a web site with access to a network coordinate system can recover 6.8 bits/hr. of network location from one corrupt Tor router, [12]. Notably, no network capability is in existence to completely negate anonymity leakage in network latency, [12], thus, the minimization of anonymity leakage in network latency becomes critically salient. The purpose of this paper is to investigate network latency anonymity leaks, and propose practical techniques for their reduction. In this direction, we investigate the following technical question: what implementation techniques can be configured to truly reduce anonymity leaks using deployable systems. Here, an extension of the popular Tor security strategies and unique configuration of the popular network anonymity techniques (algorithms) for future implementation are presented.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
Network security. Network anonymity loss reduction. Secure networks and communication. Anonymous communications.
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Anyanwu, L.O., Keengwe, J., Arome, G. (2010). Anonymity Leakage Reduction in Network Latency. In: Sobh, T. (eds) Innovations and Advances in Computer Sciences and Engineering. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3658-2_98
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3658-2_98
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