Abstract
This chapter raises a problem for a certain brand of moral error theory, the “business as usual” error theory advocated by John L. Mackie (amongst others). I argue that this position is incoherent, for the practices that sustain our use of moral concepts depend on it being widely believed that there are necessary rational connections between moral judgments and motivation – connections of precisely the sort in which Mackie recommends we cease to believe. Nor is it possible for us to banish moral concepts from our thoughts and behavior. How then can we live in good faith, if (as many of us believe) internalism is in fact false? I conclude by outlining the possibilities that remain.
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- 1.
Mackie and Joyce tend to speak of “objective prescriptivity” rather than “internalism” as the problematic feature of morality. But on a common interpretation of the argument from queerness, a crucial part of what makes objectively prescriptive properties objectionably “queer” is that they are supposed to be internalist: they are objective features of a situation that are supposed to be intrinsically motivating or action-guiding, independently of an agent's antecedent desires or purposes.
- 2.
There might be arguments for a moral error theory that do not involve or require the rejection of internalism, holding that it is some other essential feature of morality that is uninstantiated. My argument here is directed only at those arguments for the error theory that turn, in one way or another, on the falsity of internalism.
- 3.
The reason moral abolitionists usually offer in favor of abolitionism over business as usual is not that business as usual is not a coherent option for a Mackie-style error theorist, but rather that the world would be on balance a more salubrious place if we gave up on the whole business of morality. For defenses of moral abolitionism see Hinckfuss (1987); Garner (1994) and this volume.
- 4.
Here I obviously do not mean to claim that we cannot abandon or radically revise particular first-order moral viewpoints, such as the idea that slavery is justified. Clearly we can and (thankfully) do.
- 5.
For an influential discussion of varieties of internalism see Brink (1989, pp. 37–41). See also Sinnott-Armstrong, this volume.
- 6.
This is the version of internalism that David Brink calls “weak hybrid internalism about motivation” (1989, pp. 37–41).
- 7.
It is, I grant, somewhat mysterious why they would even have the word “wrong,” given that it seems to pick out nothing that is of any practical interest or significance to them. Perhaps it serves some recherché theoretical purpose.
- 8.
See also Joyce (2001, pp. 26–27).
- 9.
Thanks to Richard Joyce for pointing this out.
- 10.
See Pigden, this volume, for an analysis of Nietzsche's metaethical views.
- 11.
For discussion, see Lovibond (1992).
- 12.
This is also broadly the view of Charles Stevenson (1944).
- 13.
Thanks to David Braddon-Mitchell for pointing out this option.
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Acknowledgments
Special thanks are due to Robert Bezimienny, David Braddon-Mitchell, and the editors of this volume for very helpful comments and suggestions.
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West, C. (2010). Business as Usual? The Error Theory, Internalism, and the Function of Morality. In: Joyce, R., Kirchin, S. (eds) A World Without Values. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 114. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3339-0_11
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