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Appeal to Rites and Personhood

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Reconstructionist Confucianism

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture ((PSCC,volume 17))

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Abstract

In contemporary bioethics there are such salient questions as: What is a person? What is the essence of personhood? Where can we find a general standard to judge the presence or absence of personhood? These are not ordinary questions within a traditional Confucian morality, but one can ask such questions within a Confucian framework. In this chapter these questions and their answers are approached in terms of the ritual-embedded character of persons. This chapter recognizes that it is vitally important to distinguish a standard for personhood and a conception of personhood. A standard for personhood is a narrow concept. It sets down a particular criterion of a person by which people can judge whether a given entity is a person in a relevant context. A conception of personhood is a broad concept. It usually includes accounts of what the nature of a person is, where a person is from, what relation a person has to other beings, and etc.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Here Engelhardt suggests that both devout Christians and enthusiastic animal-rights advocates, as persons, should negotiate with each other peacefully. This, however, already goes beyond the conceptual issue of personhood.

  2. 2.

    More specifically, the Confucian view of human life can be explicated in terms of the crucial Chinese concept of qi (). Qi is taken to be the basic elements of the universe. They are both physical and mental. Although the theory of qi is further developed by Neo-Confucians in later dynasties, Classical Confucians, including Confucius, already adopted the concept to convey their thought on human life (e.g., Analects 16.7; Liji:Jiyi, ). Basically, Confucians believe that human life is made up of the finest and noblest qi of the universe and is therefore most valuable in comparison with other living beings in the world. Everyone must acquire such essential qi in order to be alive. It is directly through the work of one’s ancestors (especially one’s parents), rather than a transcendent God, that such essential qi is transferred, transformed and developed into one’s life. Accordingly, one’s parents cannot be understood merely as a medium for one’s life to be formed or ensouled by God, although Confucians do believe that God or Heaven has set the nature and maintained the order of the human world as well as the entire universe. Indeed, for Confucians, one’s life is a gift from one’s ancestors. It is Heaven’s mandate that one must be formed and born into the world through the union of one’s father and mother. But this is not sufficient automatically for one to be a person with dignity and power. One must cultivate oneself by participating in li to become an authentic person.

  3. 3.

    This is obviously a simplified version of the Confucian view on abortion. In any case, the Confucian view is virtue-guided, rites-based and context-relevant. It cannot be predicated by a single, absolute standard for personhood. For example, in the oft-cited case in which one can save either the mother or the fetus, but not both, Confucianism would hold that one should save the mother, not the fetus. This decision can be justified not by comparing the different individual values of the mother and the fetus, but by considering the common good of the family in which it would be unrighteous (buyi, ) not to save the mother. In contrast, if the pregnant woman happens to be a terminally ill patient who will have only two-month life to lead, Confucians would argue for saving the fetus rather than the mother, because the woman is going to die very soon anyway in this special case. Indeed, if pressed, Confucians can offer more specific reasons to defend their decision in each case, regardless of whether the fetus is a person or not.

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Correspondence to Ruiping Fan .

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Fan, R. (2010). Appeal to Rites and Personhood. In: Reconstructionist Confucianism. Philosophical Studies in Contemporary Culture, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3156-3_13

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