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Responsibility in Context pp 125–139Cite as

Moral Responsibility for Others: Why Does the “Being for” Always Precede the “Being with”

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Abstract

This article represents a short debate between sociological and ontological conceptions of moral responsibility for the Other, which results in a third alternative, a sum of the two and some more. I shall analyse the three distinct aspects of an agent’s moral responsibility for the Other. First, I shall explain what it means to be moral by nature, that we have the natural capability to behave morally because we are emotional as well as rational beings, but that this capability, again due to our nature, always remains in potentia. Secondly, I shall present a view that our moral capacity for practicing moral behaviour is and can only be developed dialectically through our relationships with others. Thirdly, I shall argue that both of these premises need to be understood in light of my alternative argument: we primarily have responsibility for others due to the plurality of our human condition, where choosing to either have or not to have responsibility for others simply is not an option.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Vetlesen (1993).

  2. 2.

    Bauman (1989).

  3. 3.

    Ibid., 183.

  4. 4.

    Ibid., 178–179.

  5. 5.

    Ibid., 178.

  6. 6.

    Ibid., 177.

  7. 7.

    Vetlesen (1993).

  8. 8.

    Tester (2001).

  9. 9.

    Private correspondence.

  10. 10.

    Aristotle (1996).

  11. 11.

    Franco (1999).

  12. 12.

    Vetlesen (1994).

  13. 13.

    See also: Klein (1988); Winnicot (1971); Benjamin (1988).

  14. 14.

    Kohut (1977).

  15. 15.

    Bowlby (1971, 1989).

  16. 16.

    Bauman (1993).

  17. 17.

    Ibid., 32–35.

  18. 18.

    Vetlesen (1994, 382).

  19. 19.

    Bauman (1989, 179).

  20. 20.

    Bauman (1993, 48).

  21. 21.

    Vetlesen (1993, 377).

  22. 22.

    Arendt (1965).

  23. 23.

    Arendt (1970).

  24. 24.

    Arendt (1970).

  25. 25.

    See also: Stern (2000); Stern (2002).

  26. 26.

    Bauman (1989, 183).

  27. 27.

    Ibid., 188.

  28. 28.

    Cohen (1994).

  29. 29.

    Ibid., 185.

  30. 30.

    Vetlesen (2003).

  31. 31.

    Cohen (1994).

  32. 32.

    Peperzak (1993, 92).

  33. 33.

    Levinas (1981).

  34. 34.

    Cohen (1994, 187).

  35. 35.

    Levinas (1985).

  36. 36.

    Cohen (1994, 188).

  37. 37.

    Vetlesen (2003).

  38. 38.

    Arendt (1970).

  39. 39.

    Peperzak (1993).

  40. 40.

    Foucault (1998).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Gorana Ognjenovic

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  1. Blomsterveien 27, Nesoddtangen, 1450, Norway

    Gorana Ognjenovic

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Ognjenovic, G. (2010). Moral Responsibility for Others: Why Does the “Being for” Always Precede the “Being with”. In: Ognjenovic, G. (eds) Responsibility in Context. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-3037-5_9

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