Advertisement

Consciousness

  • Mark Rowlands
Chapter

Abstrct

The phenomenological study of consciousness is the study of consciousness from the inside. The simplicity of this definition is, however, merely apparent. The idea of studying consciousness from the inside is amenable to two distinct interpretations. One of these interpretations is almost universally presupposed in recent influential scientific and philosophical treatments of consciousness outside of the phenomenological tradition. The other interpretation forms the conceptual core of the phenomenological approach but has, for the most part, been curiously overlooked in those recent scientific and philosophical treatments.

When recent influential scientific and philosophical treatments of consciousness talk of studying consciousness from the inside, they do so through the prism of what Husserl called the natural attitude. From the phenomenological perspective, on the other hand, the idea of studying consciousness from the inside is constituted precisely by the rejection of the natural attitude. The two interpretations are, therefore, irreducibly distinct. They are not, necessarily, incompatible: arguably, both may be required for a complete understanding of consciousness. However, the distinctness of the interpretations does mean that recent scientific and philosophical treatments of consciousness have overlooked something crucial to consciousness. Indeed, I shall argue that they have overlooked what is most important about consciousness.

Keywords

Apple Tree Conscious Experience Natural Attitude Intentional Object Blind Person 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Husserl E (1970) Logical investigations (trans: Findlay J). Routledge, LondonGoogle Scholar
  2. Husserl E. (1983) Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy (trans: Kersten F). Martinus Nijhoff, The HagueGoogle Scholar
  3. Jackson F (1982) Epiphenomenal qualia. Philos Q 32:127-132CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Jackson F (1986) What Mary didn’t know. J Philos 83:291-295CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Kaplan D (1989) Demonstratives. In: Almog I, Perry J, Wettstein H (eds) Themes from Kaplan. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  6. Kripke S (1980) Naming and necessity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
  7. McGinn C (1989) Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind 98:349-366CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. McGinn C (1991) The Problem of consciousness. Basil Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  9. McGinn C (2004) Consciousness and its objects. Oxford University Press, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Merleau-Ponty M (1962) The phenomenology of perception (trans: Smith C). Routledge, LondonGoogle Scholar
  11. Nagel T (1974) ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ Philos Rev 83:435-450. (Reprinted in Nagel (1979) Mortal questions. Cambridge University Press, New York. All page references are to the latter).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Nagel T (1986) The view from nowhere. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  13. Noë A (2004) Action in perception, MIT Press, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
  14. O’Regan K, Noë A (2001) A sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness. Brain Behav Sci 24: 939-1031CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Polanyi M (1962) Personal knowledge. Routledge, LondonGoogle Scholar
  16. Rowlands M (1999) The body in mind: understanding cognitive processes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/EnglandCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Rowlands M (2001) The nature of consciousness. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Rowlands M (2002) Two dogmas of consciousness. J Conscious Stud 5-6. Special edition, Noë A (ed) Is the visual world a grand illusion?Google Scholar
  19. Rowlands M (2003) Consciousness: the transcendentalist manifesto. Phenomenol Cogn Sci 2(3):205-221CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Rowlands M (2006) Body language: representation in action. MIT Press, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
  21. Yarbus A (1967) Eye movements and vision. Plenum, New YorkGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark Rowlands
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of MiamiCoral GablesFL

Personalised recommendations