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Towards a Formalism for Expressing Structures of Consciousness

  • Eduard Marbach
Chapter

Abstract

The objective of developing a formalism in Phenomenology is threefold. First, a formalism should help the phenomenologist to put down in more precise and stable form what this or that means in his or her attempt reflectively to describe conscious experiences. Second, it should facilitate communication of phenomenological findings. Third, it should advance the elaboration of agreement procedures among researchers of consciousness using first-person methodologies. To enable intersubjective agreement concerning essentially subjective, first-person data would, in itself, seem to be a valuable goal for an investigation of consciousness within philosophical Phenomenology.1 Moreover, such agreement is no doubt requisite for successfully integrating phenomenological data within scientific studies of consciousness in the Cognitive Sciences.2

Keywords

Conscious Experience Double Object Mountain Landscape Pictorial Object Philosophical Phenomenology 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eduard Marbach
    • 1
  1. 1.Prof. emer. for Phenomenology and Philosophy of MindInstitute of Philosophy, University of BernBernSwitzerland

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