In mixed differences of opinion, unlike in the non-mixed differences of opinion discussed in Chapter 5, the parties take an opposite standpoint with regard to the same proposition. They are both the protagonists of their own standpoints but are furthermore antagonists of each others standpoints. Both parties are therefore resigned to an onus probandi by virtue of the pragma-dialectical burden of proof rule.
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Notes
- 1.
Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003) show that the sequence in which parties have to defend their standpoints depends on the pragmatic status quo.
- 2.
Incidentally, this rule does not apply wholly or unconditionally – exactly as is the case in non-mixed differences of opinion there are situations one could think of where it is perfectly reasonable that the protagonist is released from his onus probandi (for example if the protagonist has already defended the same standpoint in the presence of the same antagonist, while yet nothing has changed either in the starting points or in the discussion rules or when the protagonist has a challenger who will not commit himself to anything nor abide by any rules).
- 3.
The expected values for the statistical model (with two fixed factors A (in this case type of difference of opinion) and B (in this case presumption or non-presumption standpoint), a random factor respondent (in this case r) which is crossed with A and B and with the random factor replication (in this case w(AB), which in its turn is nested within the interaction of AB) that lies at the bottom of these statistical tests are unknown – that is why sum of squares we developed them ourselves making use of the existing algorithms. The expected values for the quadrate sum of the 9 sources of variance which appear in the statistical model can be formulated as follows (for this purpose we used the following conventions: we use capital letters to indicate fixed factors, identical lower case to show the relevant levels of the factor. Random factors are given in lower case; nested factors are also shown in lower case but with the factor nested behind it in parenthesis. Variance components for random factors are indicated with σ2, fixed factors with θ2).
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1.
A:bwrθ2 A+ rσ 2 w(AB) +bwσ 2 A × r+ σ 2 w(AB) × r + σ 2 e
-
2.
B:awrθ2 B+ rσ 2 w(AB)+ awσ 2 B × r+ σ 2 w(AB) × r+ σ 2 e
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3.
w(AB):rσ 2 w(AB)+ σ 2 w(AB) × r + σ 2 e
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4.
r: abwrσ 2 r+ σ 2 w(AB) × r + σ 2 e
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5.
A × B:wrθ2 A × B+ wσ 2 A × B × r+ σ 2 w(AB) × r+ rσ 2 w(AB) + σ 2 e
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6.
A × r:bwσ 2 A × r+ σ 2 w(AB) × r + σ 2 e
-
7.
B × r:awσ 2 B × r+ σ 2 w(AB) × r+ σ 2 e
-
8.
w(AB) × r:σ 2 w(AB) × r+ σ 2 e
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9.
A × B × r:wσ 2 A × B × r+ σ 2 e
From the expected values given above, it may be concluded that a regular F ratio for example, testing the effect of the fixed factor A (it could equally have been of B or of the interaction AB) is not present. That means for the statistical testing of these effects that quasi Fs have to be constructed compiled a quasi F. As far as the statistical testing off fixed factor A is concerned, we have, on the basis of the above expected values, for both the numerator and the denominator from the composites of MS-terms: (MS(A) + MS (w(AB) × r))/(MS(w(AB) + MS(A × r))). The non-unicity of this quasi: F stems from the fact, amongst others, that testing the effect of A could equally have been carried out via (MS(A) – MS(w(AB)))/(MS(A × r) – MS(w(AB) × r)). The obvious disadvantage of this last procedure is, of course, that the resulting (quasi)F in principle can also have a negative number as an outcome.
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1.
- 4.
The average score for the argumentum ad misercordiam is unlike in the previous study on the (too) high side. In previous empirical studies this fallacy had a position between, on the one hand, the abusive variant and, on the other hand, the tu quoque variant of the argumentum ad hominem. However, this deviation can be explained: apart from possible sampling errors (unlike in the previous study where the argumentum ad misericordiam was represented by at least 4 replications, in this study there are only 2 replications present) the high average can be explained from the fact that in both fragments where this fallacy appears something strange or odd happens. The very first fragment that was presented to the respondents contains an argumentum ad misercordiam (average 4.16). The respondents at that stage perhaps have no idea of how reasonable or unreasonable the other fragments are and therefore judge moderately (neither reasonable nor unreasonable). Furthermore, nota bene, it is in that very first fragment that a student puts her teacher under pressure: “(Teacher and students in one classroom). A: This paper is only worth a D. B: You can’t do that to me, I spent more than a month working on it.” There is also something wrong with the second representative of the argumentum ad misericordiam; here is an example: “(Councilmen and councilwomen in a meeting). A: The city council should leave the Bronx in tact. B: No, it’s about time the city council started demolishing that ramshackled area. A: But we can’t do that to all the old people who have lived there all their lives, can we now?” This tactic of appealing to pity is typical of the so-called altruistic variant of the ad misericordiam fallacy, which we mentioned earlier. As expected the respondents deemed this variant much less unreasonable than the so-called egocentric variant. In this last variant, the opposing party is blackmailed emotionally by causing compassion with the person of the antagonist; in the altruistic variant, the opposing party is put under emotional pressure by “only” causing compassion for one or more persons other than the antagonist. Furthermore, and that is what this issue is all about, that last altruistic argument of A could simply be explained as a type of pragmatic argumentation and therefore not as fallacious argumentation.
- 5.
Our respondents seem to have views more akin to Whately’s ideas about the burden of proof.
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van Eemeren, F., Garssen, B., Meuffels, B. (2009). The Opening Stage: The Obligation-to-Defend (II). In: Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness. Argumentation Library, vol 16. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-2614-9_6
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