Belief and reality

The previous chapter saw the introduction of the three hypotheses central to our attempt to provide a model that will explain the basic premise ([TBP]). The three hypotheses all link an agent's conviction concerning the reality of a particular agent to certain other beliefs and to the availability of evidence in support of these other beliefs. As has already been emphasized, it is vital to understand that the hypotheses are epistemological and not metaphysical in nature, and also that the hypotheses deal with an agent's conviction concerning the reality of a particular other person and not the reality of an abstract entity.

In this chapter we will examine these hypotheses further. The overall aim is to show that our conviction concerning the reality of a particular other person with whom we are interacting is indeed composite — an epistemological construct influenced and logically dependent on the formation of other beliefs. The more specific aim is to show that our conviction concerning the reality of a particular other person is dependent on those specific beliefs captured in the three hypotheses. In doing this, we will have covered important ground in accounting for the role of ‘the face of the other’ for the ethical character of interaction.