Skip to main content

Reflecting on Market Size and Entry under Oligopoly

  • Conference paper

Part of the book series: New Economic Windows ((NEW))

Abstract

In a homogeneous product market with n firms we explore the following. How do the equilibriumconfigurations change with increase in market size and with entry of additional firms? Regarding the effects of increase in market size, we prove some counterintuitive results. On the effects of entry, we reaffirm the existing results in the literature and reinterpret them. In all cases we provide illustrative examples.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   139.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   179.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   249.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Amir, R. and V.E. Lambson (2000) “On the effects of entry in Cournot Markets” Review of Economic Studies 67 235–254

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer 91985) “Multimarket oligopoly: strategic substitutes and complements Journal of Political Economy 93 488–511

    Google Scholar 

  3. Dastidar, K.G. (2000) “Is a unique Cournot equilibrium locally stable?” Games and Economic Behaviour 32 206–218

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Gaudet, G. and S.W. Salant (1991) “Uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium: new results from old methods” Review of Economic Studies 58 399–404

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Kolstad, C.D. and L. Mathiesen (1987) “Necessary and sufficient conditions for uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium” 54, 681–690

    Google Scholar 

  6. Mankiw, G.N. and M.D. Whinston (1986) “Free entry and social inefficiency” Rand Journal of Economics 17 48–58

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Seade, J. (1980) “On the effects of entry” Econometrica 48 479–489

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Vives, X. (1999) Oligopoly pricing: old ideas and new tools MIT Press, Cambridge USA

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2010 Springer-Verlag Italia

About this paper

Cite this paper

Dastidar, K.G. (2010). Reflecting on Market Size and Entry under Oligopoly. In: Basu, B., Chakravarty, S.R., Chakrabarti, B.K., Gangopadhyay, K. (eds) Econophysics and Economics of Games, Social Choices and Quantitative Techniques. New Economic Windows. Springer, Milano. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-88-470-1501-2_36

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics