Abstract
Pain has been a central concept in moral theories, especially among those that take the conceptual pair of pain–pleasure as central to its very formulation. Thus in a way, they present to us a way of understanding the role of pain in its holistic avatar within the fabric of one’s being as being-in-the-world. This essay first undertakes the tracing of this ontology of pain within such moral frameworks through a brief exegetical exercise that is intent on highlighting that the ontology of pain that emerges through these various moral theories is uniformly informed by the principle of contrariety and the principle of naturalness. The second part of the essay would, through broad strokes, bring to fore the implications of these principles upon the ontology of pain. Through this, it would highlight why the ontology of pain as conceived within these moral theories cannot naturally translate into a fully fleshed out discourse on the social ontology of pain and remain, at best, an asocial ontology of pain.
I am grateful to Joseph Lobo and Shannon Hoff for their critical inputs.
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- 1.
The term ‘suffering’ has a much broader connotation and cannot be unproblematically identified with the term ‘pain’. For instance, a person with bodily deformity may not experience pain, but he/she may nevertheless be suffering. Simply put, following Eric Cassel, bodies are in pain while persons, notwithstanding its ambiguous connotations, suffer (2004, p. v). However, given the scope of this chapter in terms of its engagement with moral theories, the term ‘pain’ is used to stand for the term ‘unpleasantness’ to impart to it a broader connotation than its connotative identification with ‘afflictions of the body’. In doing so, one can fruitfully speak of pain in terms of the ‘pain of boredom’, ‘painful company’, ‘pain of guilt’ and so on, and as there are unpleasant sensations, there are unpleasant memories as well. Here, ‘pain’ therefore means something that is ‘unpleasant’ as it captures the fundamental sense in which it is employed within the moral discourse that the essay engages with.
- 2.
The consequences of this dominant tendency, on the one hand has led to the steady reduction of the connotation of the term ‘pain’ to mean the mechanical, determinist, and law-governed representation of the complex system of nervous transmission from the site of injured tissues to the brain, within medical science. This representation of pain was far more materialistic and reductive than the one conceived by Descartes himself (see Morris 1994, pp. 12–13). Such a representation, however, was shaken, first by the phenomenon of pain without lesion, and then by the rise of knowledge of chronic pain. Though such reductive representation of the notion is now being seriously questioned, following the seminal work by Morris (1991), one cannot also ignore the rise of pain-scales, and algometry within the ‘scientifically’ oriented disciplines like psychology and psychophysics (see for instance, Noble et al. 2005; Melzack 1983). Needless to say, the term ‘pain’ has come to mean significantly different things for people engaged with it in different disciplines. In fact, the difference of the connotative aspect of the term ‘pain’ between the sciences and the humanities is so divergent in terms of the sense signified that many a times what is common is merely the term. This oneness of sense can perhaps be sought to be addressed, as suggested by Boddice, by “training of the ear and of the pen” (2014, p. 2).
- 3.
This was one of the crucial reasons for the interest in ‘phantom limbs’ , for it set to seriously challenge this identification by highlighting the experience of pain in the absence of its bodily correlate that could act as its locus. Phantom limbs thus challenged the very idea that there could be no pain without lesion.
- 4.
From the range of conceptually oriented scholarly articles available on the notions of pain and pleasure, one can see that it was a theme of great interest from the late nineteenth century. For instance, see Brinton (1876), Stanley (1889), Marshall (1889, 1891, 1895), Bain (1892), Nichols (1892a, b), Hutchinson (1897), Anonymous (1921).
- 5.
The literature on ‘pain’, following the popularity of the two seminal works, that by Scarry (1985) and Morris (1991), in my reading can be precisely categorized along this division. While both Scarry and Morris seek to argue against the narrow envisaging of pain in strict medical terms, the former seeks to do so by exploring the question of ‘what is the import of pain to my being’ while the latter seeks to open up the medical discourse to the question, ‘what is the import of my being to pain?’.
- 6.
The ‘principle of familiarity’ was also invoked by psychologists and ‘medical professionals’. Instantiating the invocation of this principle, Thomas Lewis, who was closely associated with both, the field of medicine, as well as psychology, begins the Preface of his Pain by declaring that “[r]eflection tells me that I am so far from being able satisfactorily to define pain, of which I here write, that the attempt could serve no useful purpose. Pain, like similar subjective things, is known to us by experience and described by illustration. The usage of the term in this book will be clear enough to anyone who reads its pages; to build up a definition in words or to substitute some phrase would carry neither the reader nor myself farther…” (1942, p. v).
- 7.
Hippocratic medicine is structurally grounded within the triadic notions of disease, the patient and the physician, or what is often referred to as the ‘Hippocratic Triangle’. Within Hippocratic medicine , as Rey emphasizes, the patient’s description of his pain is of “greater significance than in other concepts of medicine” (1995, p. 20), and that within the Hippocratic system “pain signifies… which is certainly not to be taken as an isolated symptom but rather as part of an overall picture of how the patient looks, what his behavior is like compared to how he generally behaves, his stools, urine, sweat, etc.” (p. 20).
- 8.
The construal of pain in this manner is what would be later picked up by Epicureans and extended to its logical entailments.
- 9.
Further, his argument that conceiving pleasure strictly in terms of a ‘coming-to-be’ would fail to accommodate pleasures, like those of “contemplation”, “learning”, and “the pleasures of smell, and many sounds, sights, memories and hopes as well”, on the ground that these are “painless pleasures” for “no deficiency of anything has arisen, of which there might come to be a replenishment” (1173b), rather resonates the Socratic classification of “pleasures and pain of the soul alone” in the Philebus (32c) instead of positioning itself in stark contrast to it.
- 10.
For Aristotle, these pleasures are, however, ‘remedial’ in nature and are ‘incidentally pleasant’ and are not to be confused with the ‘naturally pleasant’ which is the mark of a ‘pleasant state’. The latter is “pleasant by nature” and produces “action in a healthy nature” in contrast to the former which merely restores it to a state of healthy nature (1154b).
- 11.
In a sense, this is akin to the impoverishment of aesthetics that comes about when one treats shadows as an ‘absence’ of light, as highlighted by Tanizaki (1977).
- 12.
The Epicureans distinguish desires into two major classes: one that is natural and the other that is vain or empty. The class of natural desires is further divided into two classes, namely, necessary natural desires, and the class that lacks this necessity. Depending upon what these desires are necessary for, the class of necessary natural desires is further divided into three kinds: desires that are necessary for happiness, for the repose of the body, and the third for life itself. Although Epicurus is not explicit about the hierarchy of these desires, it is clear that the hierarchy moves from those necessary for life itself, to those that pertain to the body and happiness, with desires that are empty or vain placed at the lowest rung of the scale.
- 13.
Although the absence of pain entails an absence of pleasure, given that the recognized telos of human life within the Epicurean formulation is a desirable state, pleasantness must be predicated of it. Such ‘pleasantness’ though distinct from the kinetic pleasure that is experienced in the negation of pain, must nevertheless be a pleasant state. It is the recognition of this tacit demand grounded in the nonnegotiable relation between desirability and any conceived telos of one’s existence that forces the Epicureans to enigmatically uphold the ‘state of complete absence of pain’ as being marked by ataraxia and aponia, while at the same time as being pleasant. It is also for this reason that the division of pleasure into the two classes of kinetic and katastemaic becomes central in the Epicurean doctrines. This division is made clearer in De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, where Lucius Torquatus, an Epicurean, clarifies the division to Cicero, who is unwilling to accept the Epicurean identification of pleasure with a state of complete absence of pain. Torquatus explains that the highest good which could be negatively characterized as the complete absence of pain, and positively as a state of aponia and ataraxia is a case of ‘static’ (katastemaic) pleasure, comparable analogically to a state of pleasure when one experiences no thirst at all that demands to be quenched, while the pleasures that one experiences from the satiation of anticipated or intended desires are ‘kinetic’ and can be compared analogically to the pleasure experienced when one drinks when thirsty (DeFi.: II.9). Torquatus’ explanation is rooted in the Epicurean thesis that the highest good cannot vary in intensity or degree and is “the limit and highest point of pleasure” (DeFi.: I.38–39); a state that does not seem to hold true for pleasures emanating from gratification, given that one can re-project the limit of one’s desire to be gratified and thereby redefine the degree to which it is gratified either in terms of its intensity or its degree. The highest pleasure, on the other hand, that ensues from the complete removal of pain is a state of ataraxia and aponia, which the Epicureans, therefore, hold to be a state that cannot be conceptually improved upon through an act of reinventing the limit of one’s feeling of a lack of anything, and therefore, the state too dissolves any possibility of reinventing the limit of one’s feeling of being satiated.
- 14.
The Buddhist perspective, irrespective of the various sectarian affiliations, is firmly rooted in the fundamental belief that existence is suffering (duḥkha) and that the ultimate telos of human life, that is nirvāṇa, lies in the cessation of this suffering (duḥkhanirodha).
- 15.
It is this ontological trait of the inalienability of a being from Nature, or what is natural to its being and attunement with the rhythm of Nature, that forms the ground for all variants of the ‘cradle argument’.
- 16.
This of course assumes that the nature of particular things is in some way uniform so as to ensure a harmonious nature as a whole, which is to say that the varieties of natures of particular beings reconcile and manifest the neat Nature of the whole, or explicate the cosmic nature as such. This seamless blending of the anthropic into the cosmic is a central feature of the Stoics as well as the Epicureans. The Stoics, as Long stresses, firmly held that “from the long-term point of view nothing… is independent of Nature’s ordering… From the perspective of the part, poverty and ill-health are unnatural to mankind. But such an analysis is only made possible by abstracting human nature from universal Nature. From the perspective of the whole even such conditions are not unnatural, because all Natural events contribute to the universal well-being” (p. 180), even if it runs counter to the human perspective. One must note that for the Stoics it is “the harmonizing of the dissonance, not the creation of dissonance” that is the primary task of Nature. Addressing this issue of the accommodation of distinct and sometimes contrary particular natures within the universal nature in the discourse of the Stoics, Long remarks that, “…[i]t is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Stoics’ desire to attribute everything to a single principle has produced a fundamental incoherence… But to this they would reply that the harmony of the universe as a whole is something which transcends any attempt to view the world from the perspective of a particular part [and that if]… we view Nature’s activities as contradictory this is due to the limitations of human vision” (p. 182).
- 17.
The emphasis on ‘nature’ as a philosophical category within the doctrines of the Stoics and the Epicureans is also, as Inwood suggests, a move to satisfy the philosophical urge of stability, a characteristic that is taken to be the hallmark of any sound philosophical paradigm by the Greek thinkers (1985, p. 224).
- 18.
Ethical perversion, for the Stoics is thus symptomatic of dissonance between human nature and Nature brought about by undisciplined impulses ( oikeiosis) that either misleadingly seem geared towards our primary impulse, or move away from our primary impulse, which is to be in harmony with one’s true nature that is pervaded by Nature itself. The Stoic, as Inwood reads, thus understands the unnatural, or the irrational, as a case of oikeiosis emerging from misunderstandings (1985, p. 184). Therefore ethical perversions for the Stoics result from ‘falsehoods that extend to the mind’ and are the root cause of passions or emotions, which are but perversions that emerge, as Zeno claims, by virtue of ‘an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul’ (DL VII, pp. 110–112). It is this discerning of what is really choiceworthy that is the hallmark of a wise man. It is this perceptiveness on his part that rescues him from the infirmity that arises out of an error of discerning that which is natural and thus choiceworthy, that is sought to be highlighted in the declaration of the Stoics that ‘the wise man is passionless’ (DL VII, pp. 114–117) and can never err (DL VII, pp. 121–123). The centrality of Reason for the Stoics emerges precisely due to the fact that the route to the discernment to what is natural is through it alone. Reason is thus seen as the supervening craftsman that enables the agreement of human beings with their true nature that is in resonance with the immanent order of Nature. The primordial inalienability of the virtuous from Nature is reinforced by the Stoics’ insistence that “when a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting points of nature are never perverse” (DL VII, pp. 88–90).
- 19.
Given the close relation that was sought to be established by the Stoics, following Zeno’s Exposition of Doctrine, between what they considered as the three principal parts of philosophy, namely, the logical, the physical and, the ethical, first explicitly demarcated by Xenocrates [Zeno’s discourses at the Stoa following that precise order as we are informed by Diogenes Laertius (DL VII, pp. 39–41)], the naturalistic grounding of the ethical in their hands pivotally depended upon the epistemological positions (DL VII, pp. 48–51) that followed from their adherence to the principles of metaphysical atomism. Hence, in the discourse of the Stoics, the ethical is deeply grounded in their understanding of the nature of the knowing subject and the modes of knowledge production. This epistemic emphasis thus catapults the theory of senses to a place of primacy within the discourse of the Stoics, much prior to the position of cardinality conferred to them during the modern period by thinkers now categorized as ‘Empiricists’ (Hume in particular, who was familiar with their works). This epistemic grounding of the ethical is highlighted by the central position occupied by the doctrine of presentation (phantasia) and sensation (lekta) in their discourse and its relation to their atomistic metaphysics (see DL VII, pp. 43–54). This can also be read alternatively from the point of view of the primacy of logic within Stoicism, which they hold to be the underlying structure, the “bones and sinews”, the protective “shell” or “fence” (DL VII, pp. 39–41) that makes possible the access to, and the flourishing of, truth and the grasping of nature as such, be it within the province of Physics or Ethics (VII, pp. 81–83). If one bears in mind the fact that the logic, at the least for the Stoics, did not confine itself to its present day narrowly delineated province of propositions, and argument forms, but denoted a much broader domain of the science of the study of logos or the study of the rational order of the cosmos or nature, along with the art of articulating the same in speech. Thus, it is useful to remind ourselves, as suggested by Inwood, that for the Stoics, “speaking well also meant speaking truly and virtuously” (p. 226). Thus, the discerning and disciplining of the movement of reason is an essential precondition for the attaining of true presentations of nature without precipitancy of the mind’s assent to sensations (DL 46–48), which is to say the acceptance of the mind to take the sensations as faithful representations of the object or nature. And given that our actions are governed by sensations or what we make of presentations, “unless we have our perceptions well trained, we are liable to fall into unseemly conduct and heedlessness” (DL VII, pp. 46–48). Hence, for the Stoics the wise man is synonymous with a true dialectician (DL VII, pp. 81–83). Following Ian Mueller, Ianwood remarks that for the Stoics, “logic had both an epistemological and a moral significance… [for]… it helps a person to see what is the case, reason effectively about practical affairs, stand his or her ground amid confusion, differentiate the certain from the probable, and so forth” (p. 229).
- 20.
The Stoics’ denial of pleasure and derivatively of pain is a nuanced rejection and cannot be treated as a wholesale one. That is, what is rejected in Stoicism is the Epicurean positioning of pleasure as the primordial goal of life’s pursuit and not the experiencing of pleasure itself. For the Stoics, in its former positioning as a goal, pleasure is symptomatic of lack of mediation of impulses by reason, and thus is indicative of disease that the mind is capable of falling into, just as the body is susceptible to diseases like “gout” and “arthritis” (DLVII, pp. 114–117). It is the disease of the soul when its impulses transgress into the domain of irrationality and transform itself as an “irrational appetency” or desire or craving (DLVII, pp. 112–114). Thus, pleasure is but the pursuit of an “irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy” when in fact it is not, and conversely, pain or grief is “an irrational mental contraction” (DL 117–119), which for the Stoics are both marks of perversion of one’s being. However, as a supervening byproduct, they do hold, ‘joy’, as a ‘counterpart of pleasure’ which is a ‘rational elation’ of being in harmony (DL 114–117) with one’s nature and thereby with Nature as such.
- 21.
The mode of ‘contrariety’ is one of the six modes of meaning or sense production within their epistemological apparatus, the others being, “direct contact, resemblance, analogy, transposition, [and] composition” (DL VII, pp. 51–52).
- 22.
Although it is evident that Hume was influenced more by the doctrines of the Stoics than by those of the Epicureans, insofar as his epistemology is concerned, his extensive elaboration of the psychological machinery of human beings that positions passions as the primordial ground of the will is starkly Epicurean in its outlook (see A Treatise of Human Nature, BK II, Part III, Sect. III). However, Hume’s treatment of pain and pleasure as the primordial grounds of our actions is more intricate and nuanced than the Epicurean account. Hume’s division of pain and pleasure in terms of an experience of pain and pleasure vis-à-vis an idea of pain experience, and the differing impact of these on us (see 1911, BK I, Part III, Sect. X), and his elaborate framing of his nuanced double theory of passions in terms of this division in Part I, Book II of A Treatise of Human Nature, clearly illustrate this.
- 23.
Bentham’s Principle of Utility is resoundingly close to one of Hume’s own notes on Bayle (Mossner No. 19), now available to us as Hume’s Memoranda. Hume notes there, “[m]en might have been determined to avoid things harmful and seek the useful by the augmentation and diminution of pleasure as well as by pain….” (2007c, p. 107).
- 24.
Although Bentham’s categorization of pain and pleasure and the discussions revolving around it centre on the individual, we must note that Bentham conceives the term community as a fictitious term (1907, Chap. I. IV) or a “noun-substantive which is not the name of a real entity, perceptible or inferential… a conception of which can be obtained by consideration of the relation borne by it to a real entity…” (1932, p. 12). For Bentham, the interest of community can only be grasped through the concrete interest of the individual, and hence the community can only be understood through the reality of the individual.
- 25.
Bentham, while expressing his view on torture, justifies its use in rare cases (see Twining and Twining 1993, 519ff.).
- 26.
It must be noted that ‘collective memory’ is not ‘collective’ because it is shared; rather it is precisely because it is ‘collective’ that it is shared. It is not that one must, as a ‘particular subject’, have a pain-experience that has been had by others as well that comes to constitute a ‘collective memory of a pain-experience’. Rather, it is in the partaking of the particular subject in this collective memory of a pain-experience that enables one to experience it.
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Jung, P.G. (2016). Ontology of Pain in Moral Theories. In: George, S., Jung, P. (eds) Cultural Ontology of the Self in Pain. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2601-7_2
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