Abstract
One of the demands that the technological understanding of Being makes on the human respondent is to “gather” the meaning of phenomena in terms of the logos of efficiency. Two manifest forms can be noticed by way of which the logos of efficiency is set to work: understanding all phenomena in terms of the calculative intelligibility of capital and understanding the human respondent in terms of the efficient agency of the atomistic individual. In this way, we can make sense of the liberal–capitalistic society in its global developmental form in line with the planetary impetus of the technological understanding of Being. Community or our primordial sociality may still be the only human form of restraint that can question, subvert and disrupt both the capitalistic measure of reality and the asocial and individual istic measure of the human being. However, the thought of community is commonly fraught with the same essentialist dangers as the militant, individualistic rule of capital, which is finding global acceptance in the name “development.” Hence, Jean-Luc Nancy’s Heideggerian notion of community without communion, a community that never can coagulate into a communal substance may be seen as a possible way of responding to the global reign of capital and individual.
…development, when it revalues aspects of culture traditionally latent or peripheral, usually ends up by underwriting the psychological demands of modernity—hard this-worldly individualism, unrestrained achievement needs, aggressive competitiveness, priority of productivity principles over the expressive ones, acceptance of a mechanomorphic view of nature, and so on. These traits were not unknown to the non-modern cultures in the pre-developmental times. However, there were elaborate cultural checks on the expression of the traits.
—Ashis Nandy, “Culture, Voice and Development”, 13.
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Notes
- 1.
Heidegger understands machination/enframing as arising out of the long Western history of the Platonic–Aristotelian interpretation of Being as idea, stretching up to Nietzsche’s notion of the will (CP: 100). This interpretation is conceived as weakening and gradually subverting the pre-Socratic understanding of Being as phusis or emergence. Heidegger says that “phusis as emergence” can be experienced everywhere as in the rising of the sun, the surging of the sea, the growth and flowering of plants, coming forth of animals from the womb and so on. But phusis or the emerging sway for the early Greeks, he adds, is not one process among others, but “Being itself, by virtue of which beings first become and remain observable” (IM: 15). Heidegger’s understanding of the essence of the human being as the openness for Being or the space for disclosure, and his understanding of truth as unconcealment are all rooted in the early Greek understanding of Being as phusis or emergence. According to him “for the Greeks, disclosure and emergence prevail in the essence of every originarily emergent being (1992a: 106), which he named ‘the clearing’ or disclosedness in Being and Time. Heidegger’s notion of ‘another beginning’ as opposed to the decadent tradition means confronting the ‘unsurpassable’ first beginning, emergence or disclosure, and repeating it by reaching ahead and encroaching “differently each time on that which it itself initiates” (CP: 45).
- 2.
But for both it is a destiny—the dialectical unfolding of historical materialism for Marx and a long chapter in the unfolding history of Being for Heidegger. The difference is, for Marx and Hegel the dialectic unfolding of history is lawful and necessary, but for Heidegger, as we saw in the second chapter, historical unfolding is neither simply freakish nor scientific and law-abiding. Historical unfoldings can be hermeneutically traced to history’s beginning and to the interpretive vagaries following out of history’s beginning. For Marx, although capitalism is exploitative, it is nevertheless progressive. For Heidegger, capitalism, rather, is regressive from the point of view of the abandonment of beings by Being at the end of metaphysics, although capitalism arises out of the essential unfolding of the history of Being.
- 3.
Capitalization is used here in the sense of converting what is disclosed to one into its money value or into capital.
- 4.
As we read in Being and Time, “entities can be experienced ‘factually’ only when Being is already understood, even if it has not been conceptualized” (BT: 363). Heidegger’s efforts since 1936 at least have been to characterize the deeply hidden ontological layers of the historical west. The phenomenological rule that “[t]hat which is ontically closest and well known, is ontologically the farthest and not known at all; and its ontological signification is constantly overlooked” (BT: 69) is operational in the analysis of Gestell as well. The phenomenological task is to lay bare the structures of the ontologically significant phenomena, lying more buried and concealed than something like capital and the economy, which are palpably real in comparison with the essence of technology as enframing.
- 5.
About concealment of the danger, Heidegger writes: “We experience the danger not yet as the danger. We do not experience positionality [or enframing] as the self-pursuing and thus self-dissembling essence of Being… Instead of referring us to the danger in the essence of Being, the perils and plights precisely blind us to the danger. What is most dangerous in all this lies in the fact that the danger does not show itself as danger” (2012: 52; my emphasis). The innocuous appearance of technological understanding of Being is the danger.
- 6.
Heidegger writes: “But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic—that is, something of its own—can it have lost itself and not yet won itself” (BT: 68).
- 7.
Michael Lewis writes the following about the impossibility of total authenticity and total inauthenticity: “If there were such a thing as an authentic Dasein then it would no longer be Dasein, for Dasein exists as the process which stretches between the authentic and the inauthentic, pulled towards its own death but also pulled in the other direction, towards a birth which is common to everyone and which amounts to our factual arrival in a particular world. Without these two vectors tugging at one another the tearing that is Dasein would not occur. Every tearing requires two contradictory vectors. Utterly inauthentic Dasein would not be Dasein, and nor would utterly authentic Dasein, since this entity would be dead. There is no such thing as authentic Dasein.” (2005: 15).
- 8.
The much-discussed remark of Heidegger is the following: “Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry, in essence the same as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockading and starving of countries, the same as the production of hydrogen bombs” (2012: 27).
- 9.
I discuss in detail the notion of “dwelling” in Chap. 6.
- 10.
- 11.
I shall return in the concluding chapter to this saving grace hidden within the technological understanding of Being.
- 12.
Rawls makes it very clear in the second section of A Theory of Justice (1971) while maintaining that for international justice, a different set of liberal principles would be required. “I shall be satisfied if it is possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other societies” (1999: 7).
- 13.
According to the translator of Pedagogy of the Oppressed, “[t]he term conscientização refers to learning to perceive social, political and economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of reality” (Freire 2005: 35, n.1).
- 14.
Taylor has argued consistently in his major works such as Sources of the Self (1989) that a sense of the good powers our cultural ideals, whether individualism or instrumental rationality. About the moral source of contemporary ideals that have even lost their moral force, Taylor writes: “Learning to be the disengaged subject of rational control… is accompanied, even powered by, a sense of our dignity as rational agents.… But insofar as the sources now lie within us, more particularly, within certain powers we possess, the basis is there for an independent, i.e., non-theistic morality” (1989: 315).
- 15.
Heidegger considers the existential structure of Being-in-the-world more primordial than both embodiment and sexuality. In Being and Time, he acknowledges that our bodily being “hides a whole problematic of its own” (BT: 143) and in Zollikon Seminars (given between 1959 and 1969) that the problem of the body cannot be reduced to corporeality. He observes that our bodiliness (Leiblichkeit) “is basically not inanimate matter but a domain of that nonobjectifiable, optically invisible capacity to receive-perceive the significance of what it encounters, which constitutes the whole Da-sein” (ZS: 232). In this sense, our existential way of being embodied is called “bodying forth” (Leiben) . While bodiliness codetermines Being-in-the-world, existence or ecstatic openness towards the world is Dasein in its uttermost primordiality (see Askay 1999, Aho 2009). Similarly, in The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (1928), Heidegger maintains that the term Dasein is the neutral space that gives meaning to “every concrete factual humanity”. This neutrality means that “Dasein is neither of the two sexes” (MFL: 136) but “harbors the intrinsic possibility for being factically dispersed into bodiliness and thus into sexuality” (MFL: 137). Defending Heidegger’s ontological prioritizing of existence, Aho notes that Dasein is “an unfolding historical horizon or space of meaning that is already ‘there’ (Da), prior to the emergence of the human body and its various capacities” (Aho 2002: 3). While both Askay and Aho are interpreting Heidegger correctly, such prioritizing of the disembodied realm of meaning smacks of Cartesianism rather than its overcoming because Dasein understood as the “historical horizon or space of meaning” betrays a sense of the spiritual sphere as separated from and superior to the bodily sphere. Hence, we must rather acknowledge that both bodiliness and Being-in-the-world codetermine each other and are both equiprimordial; also that the space of meaning that Dasein is is always already sexual and gendered (see Derrida 1983). In his pursuit of these themes, Merleau-Ponty wrote that “[n]either body nor existence can be regarded as the original of the human being, since they presuppose each other, and because the body is solidified or generalized existence, and existence a perpetual incarnation” (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 192). He later radicalized the chiasmic intertwining relation between bodies and meaning, world and language, the visible and the invisible, in his notion of the “flesh”. Accordingly, he wrote that “pure ideality is itself not without flesh… It is as though the visibility that animates the sensible world were to emigrate, not outside of every body, but into another less heavy, more transparent body, as though it were to change flesh, abandoning the flesh of the body for that of language…” (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 153). Such a conception alone, I think, can truly help us overcome Cartesian dualism.
- 16.
The history of continental philosophy can be seen as the story of the rise and fall of the self, the end of “transcendental pretence”, with Solomon (1988: 4). However, what has come to an end really is the Cartesian self. Let me here briefly delineate three important ways in which the question of the self is addressed in European philosophy and Heidegger’s contribution to all these three strains of thought on the self. (i) Dan Zahavi addresses the question of the self in a Husserlian vein as a minimal experiential dimension of self-awareness (minimal self ), a pre-reflective familiarity with self, and hence rightly concludes that “Heidegger did, in fact, operate with a form of self-acquaintance that precedes reflection. When understanding his claim that no self-acquaintance can occur independently of, or prior to, our world-disclosure, it is crucial to remember that this world-disclosure contains a dimension of self from the very start and, as well, that it cannot occur independently of or prior to a disclosure of self” (2005: 84–85). That is, the three dimensions of our self-understanding (self, world and others) are codisclosed with no allusion to the temporal priority of any. (ii) The question of the self is also approached hermeneutically as an unfolding story of unity of identity (narrative self ). Charles Guignon explains that according to Heidegger, we can fully achieve authentic selfhood by taking “each moment as an integral component of the overall story” (2000: 89). The danger of losing the “primordial truth” revealed in the authentic, resolute moment of vision can be remedied according to Guignon “by reaffirming one’s resolute stance in the face of death throughout one’s life” (2000: 90). However, we must note that in fact, there is no such thing as a completely authentic Dasein (see Footnote 7 of this chapter). Heidegger writes that “there belongs to Dasein, as long as it is, a ‘not-yet’ which it will be—that which is constantly still outstanding” (BT: 286); its Being is always “determined by the ‘ahead-of-itself’” (BT: 279). Although Heidegger’s understanding of the self is narrative (Taylor 1989: 47), it is a narrative self that never completes or fulfils itself. Kevin Aho writes: “Death, as a structural component of life, reveals the finitude and forward directionality of life; it points to the possibility of my fulfillment, even though such fulfillment is impossible” (2009: 15). Challenging Guignon’s view Taylor Carman argues that “any conception of Dasein as a finished or in principle finishable self, an integrated whole, a complete occurrent entity” (2003: 267) is inaccurate. Hence, Heidegger expounds a historically unfolding, narratively structured self that constantly ruptures the meaningful unity it anticipates (see Fisher 2010). (iii) Derrida deconstructs all self-presence. John Russon understands selfhood itself as différance because “the nature of the ‘I’ is necessarily characterized by what Derrida calls différance and… what Heidegger analyzes under the name of ‘anticipatory resoluteness’ is precisely the embrace of this différance in which the self is properly itself: it is only in its embracing of its not-being-able-to-(yet)-be-itself that the self is properly itself” (Russon 2008: 103). Dasein is both self (in its narrative historizing anticipation) and not-self (as its anticipated narrative unity constantly ruptures in line with its structural form of the “ahead-of-itself”). This rupture of full self-identity can be called différance.
- 17.
Stephen Crowell writes: “Heidegger conceives individuation not as prior to the social but as a modification of it; ‘authenticity’ does not constitute sociality but merely occupies it in a different way” (2007: 56). For Heidegger, the others are “those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself—those among whom one is too” (BT: 154), and “[a]uthentic Being-one’s-Self takes the definite form of an existentiell modification of the ‘they’” (BT: 312).
- 18.
The traditional question of the problem of empathy is this: “Since only the lived experiences of my own interior are first given, how is it possible for me to apprehend the lived experiences of others as well, how can I ‘feel my way into’ them, empathize with them?” (HCT: 243).
- 19.
- 20.
The individual of modern individualism, for Nancy, “is merely the residue of the experience of the dissolution of community.… It is another, and symmetrical, figure of immanence: the absolutely detached for-itself, taken as origin and as certainty” (1991b: 3).
- 21.
While deeply aware of the fragile origins and trajectories of Western history, Heidegger nevertheless fell prey to the saving power of “the proper”. Derrida writes that Heidegger hoped for “the alliance of speech and Being in the unique word, in the finally proper name” (1997a: 27). Derrida’s reference is to the statement in “Anaximander’s Saying” (1946) that “language would have to find something unique, the unique word” to name the essence of Being and that the greater difficulty is “in preserving the purity of the discovered word in authentic thinking” than in discovering the unique word itself (AS: 276). On the contrary, according to Derrida “[t]here will be no unique name, even if it were the name of Being. And we must think this without nostalgia … outside of the myth of a purely maternal or paternal language, a lost native country of thought … we must affirm this … in a certain laughter and a certain step of the dance” (1997a: 27). Hope for the unique word, unique origins, unique community and the uniquely non-technological understanding of Being are to be relinquished.
- 22.
That Levinas is closer here to Heidegger than his own notion of the separated, enjoying self in Totality and Infinity is discussed by Michael Fagenblat (see: 2010: 105, 156–163).
- 23.
A separate study is called for on the question whether Brahminical philosophy is simply another instance of the privileging of presence as Greek (indeed Indo-European) philosophy is and whether the Buddhist interlude, on the other hand, may be seen as the critique of presence.
- 24.
In the first section of the next chapter, I engage with this possibility in my exposition of Heidegger’s ethics of human relation in terms of letting the Other be Other in her/his care for own self without alluding to the atomistic individual.
- 25.
Levinas’s reformulation of the separation between the absolutely same and the absolutely Other as “the other in the same” answers to Derrida’s question of 1964: “How could there be a ‘play of the Same’ if alterity itself was not already in the Same, with a meaning of inclusion doubtless betrayed by the word in? Without alterity in the same, how could the ‘play of the Same’ occur, in the sense of playful activity, or of dislocation, in a machine or organic totality which plays or works?” (Derrida 2001: 158). Derrida’s answer is: “the other cannot be absolutely exterior to the same without ceasing to be other; and … consequently, the same is not a totality closed in upon itself, an identity playing with itself, having only the appearance of alterity, in what Levinas calls economy, work, and history” (2001: 158).
- 26.
Because philosophy is a thoroughly critical enterprise, of which Heidegger himself is an excellent exponent as borne out especially by his post-1935 work, his failure of 1933 is that much more problematic. Marcuse contends that “a philosopher cannot make such a ‘mistake’ without thereby disavowing his own, authentic philosophy” (2005b: 176) in an interview on his disillusionment with Heidegger. Accordingly, Rockmore shows that in 1933 there was no difference at all between Heidegger’s philosophy and his worldview. He writes: “… even the most rigorously scientific philosophy … belongs to the world view of its own period. This obviously does not mean that philosophy is only a world view; it rather means that every philosophy arises and remains meaningful only within a world view. Yet as concerns Heidegger’s Nazi period, there is finally no difference between a philosophy and a world view” (1999: 111).
- 27.
Indeed in a 1929–1930 lecture course, Heidegger told his students that philosophy “is the opposite of all comfort and assurance” (FCM: 19) and after resigning as the Nazi rector of Freiburg University in 1933 that philosophy is “the unceasing, questioning struggle over the essence and Being of beings” (Heidegger 2010: 9). Heidegger insisted in 1929 that “the single, actual, and most difficult task” in philosophizing was “driving one’s own Dasein and that of others into a fruitful questionableness” (FCM: 20). But the humanistic, resolute and revolutionary tenor of philosophic questioning is given up in 1936 and the mood of an irremediable distress takes its place, which still situates the philosopher within a space of uncanny questioning.
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George, S.K. (2015). Capital, Individual and Development. In: Heidegger and Development in the Global South. Contributions To Phenomenology, vol 82. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-2304-7_4
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