Constrained Optimal Bidding Strategy in Deregulated Electricity Market

  • D. Palit
  • N. Chakraborty
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 325)


A precise and comprehensive model is designed for optimum power trading among a number of generating companies (GenCo) having thermal generating units. These GenCos are offering different bidding prices for gaining maximum profit. There may be different category of bidding situations. Possible bidding profile combinations along with some constraints are considered in case studies. The power balance constraint includes generation, demand and transmission loss, power generation limit, and fuel cost constraints. Thermal generating units are considered here. As scheduling is interconnected with bidding, economic power scheduling has been solved using Newton–Raphson method for standard IEEE 9 bus test system. Bidder’s profits and market price have been calculated in each case. For optimization of the power bidding problem, theory of dominance of game theory has been applied and justified for searching the Nash equilibrium.


Electric energy market Deregulation Economic dispatch Game theory 



We are thankful to the authority of Jadavpur University for extending all sorts of cooperation for the completion of this work.


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Copyright information

© Springer India 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Power EngineeringJadavpur UniversityKolkataIndia

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