Abstract
The World Bank now publishes estimates of adjusted savings for the world’s countries to keep track of sustainable development; the environment is seen as a gigantic capital asset. I explore these estimates for different countries. Dasgupta and Maler, who have worked on theoretical models of environmental accounting, initially used optimal control models but have shifted to modeling imperfect economies, in which institutions can affect resource allocation. Sneddon et al. suggest the importance of deliberative democracy for sustainable development, and Vatn describes the use of deliberative processes, which can build on structured information. Duflo and Pande statistically estimate that on average, dams in India increased poverty.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Dasgupta P (2012) Inclusive national accounts: introduction. Working paper no 67–12. SANDEE, Kathmandu
Dasgupta P, Maler KG (2009) Some recent developments. In: Chopra K, Dayal V (eds) Oxford handbook of environmental economics in India. Oxford University Press, New Delhi
Dasgupta P, Kristrom B, Maler KG (1997) The environment and net national product. In: Dasgupta P, Maler KG (eds) The environment and emerging development issues, vol 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Duflo E, Pande R (2007) Dams. Q J Econ 122(2):601–646
Guha R (2005) The environmentalism of the poor. In: Dryzek JS, Schlosberg D (eds) Debating the earth: the environmental politics reader. Oxford University Press, New York
Gutmann A, Thompson D (2004) Why deliberative democracy?. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Paehlke R (2005) Democracy and environmentalism. In: Dryzek JS, Schlosberg D (eds) Debating the earth: the environmental politics reader. Oxford University Press, New York
Ramsay KW (2011) Revisiting the resource curse: natural disasters, the price of oil, and democracy. Int Organ 65(03):507–529
Rodrik D (2008) One economics, many recipes: globalization, institutions, and economic growth. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Ross ML (2012) The oil curse: how petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Sen A (2000) Development as freedom. Oxford University Press, Delhi
Sneddon C, Howarth RB, Norgaard RB (2006) Sustainable development in a post-Brundtland world. Ecol Econ 57:253–268
Stock JH, Watson MW (2011) Introduction to econometrics. Addison-Wesley, Boston
Vatn A (2005) Institutions and the environment. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
World Bank (2010) The changing wealth of nations: measuring sustainable development in the new millennium. World Bank, Washington, DC
World Bank (2012) World development indicators. http://databank.worldbank.org. Accessed 5 Oct 2012
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Appendices
Appendix A.1
I compare two models: DM2 (Dasgupta and Maler 2009) with DKM1 (Dasgupta et al. 1997); we can use mathematical techniques innovatively to frame an issue differently.
In both DM2 and DKM1, welfare over time is very similar. In DM2 welfare at time t is
where C is aggregate consumption. In DKM1 current social welfare, U is a function not only of C, but also of the environment and labour.
The key difference between DKM1 and DM2 is the use of α—a resource allocation mechanism—by DM2. The co-evolution of institutions and the state of the economy is reflected in α. This means that C, resource flows R, and capital stocks K, are functions of α. DM2 write the value function V can as
\( {\text{V}}\left( {{\text{K}}_{\text{t}} , \, \alpha ,_{\,{\text{t}}}} \right) \, = {\text{ W}}_{\text{t}} , \) where Wt is given by the expression above. DM2 define sustainable development as a path where dVt/dt ≥ 0. By using the value function directly, and assuming that α is autonomous, DM2 show that dVt/dt = Σpit dKit/dt = I ≥ 0 on a sustainable development path.
In contrast, DKM1 use optimal control theory to derive the adjustments that should be made to get net national product—this is common in theoretical models dealing with this issue—and the model is silent about institutions.
DM2 argue that sustainable development requires examining wealth and not GNP or even NNP; whereas DKM1 derive results for adjustments to NNP.
Appendix A.2
In this appendix I briefly discuss the statistical assumptions behind using instrumental variables.
Let our regression equation be
And let Xi be correlated with ui because of simultaneous causality (i.e. X and Y cause each other).
We could use an instrumental variable Z to estimate the effect β1 of X on Y.
The conditions for a valid instrument are: (1) instrument relevance: the correlation between Z and X should not be zero and should be high; and (2) instrument exogeneity: the correlation between Z and u should be zero.
We can test for instrument relevance statistically. Exogeneity is subtle—we need to use thinking and judgement. If we have more than one instrument, we can use a statistical test to aid our thinking and judgement, but it is ‘incumbent on both the empirical analyst and the critical reader to use their own understanding of the empirical application to evaluate whether this assumption is reasonable’ (Stock and Watson 2011, p. 454).
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dayal, V. (2014). Sustainable Development and Institutions. In: The Environment in Economics and Development. SpringerBriefs in Economics. Springer, New Delhi. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1671-1_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1671-1_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, New Delhi
Print ISBN: 978-81-322-1670-4
Online ISBN: 978-81-322-1671-1
eBook Packages: Business and EconomicsEconomics and Finance (R0)