Abstract
In this article, we focus on computational aspects of game strategies and mechanism design. Some games or mechanisms arise the problems with computational difficulties. We argue some complexity measure of game strategy to model agents whose rationality are bounded. We think that the model of bounded rational agent is more suitable for analyzing many economic situations than that of rational agents assumed in ordinary economics. In fact, we can show that bounded rational agents can achieve Nash equilibrium in optimal auction mechanism. But human behaviors in real life have some mysterious aspects. Experiments with human-subjects showed that players could have some different expectations or actions in the game that could not be obserbed in Nash equilbrium analysis. Constructing more reasonable behavioral model of bounded rationality remains in future researches.
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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Tokyo
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Kawagoe, T. (1997). Complexity and Economics of Institutions. In: Nakamura, E.R., Kudo, K., Yamakawa, O., Tamagawa, Y. (eds) Complexity and Diversity. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-66862-6_38
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-66862-6_38
Publisher Name: Springer, Tokyo
Print ISBN: 978-4-431-66864-0
Online ISBN: 978-4-431-66862-6
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