Abstract
This study examines, from the rationalist perspective, the process and the outcome of the formation of the Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Treaty (the Ottawa Convention) established in 1997. This unprecedented treaty was established due to the leadership of middle powers such as Canada and European countries with the support of NGOs, which overcame the opposition of the USA and Asian countries. A rationalist explanation models the change from the status quo (no regulation) to a drastic state (a comprehensive ban) by focusing not on the diffusion of the anti-landmine norm but on the procedural rules adopted in a series of anti-landmine conferences. As an extension of the agenda-setter model, the model presented here assumes the agenda setter’s incomplete information on the pivotal voter’s preference. Solving for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this model, this study shows a drastic change is possible if the status quo is unfavorable both to the agenda setter and the pivotal voter. This result agrees with the empirical observations of the Ottawa Process where Canada successfully induced a comprehensive ban of anti-personnel landmines despite opposition.
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Notes
- 1.
The full name is the “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.”
- 2.
The Ottawa Convention was the culmination of transnational civil movements against landmines. The Nobel Peace Prize was awarded jointly to International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and to Jody Williams, the coordinator of the ICBL.
- 3.
- 4.
Maslen (2004: 38).
- 5.
Cameron et al. (1998: 232, 410).
- 6.
- 7.
Nearly 120 states signed the treaty by the end of 1997, which went into effect on March 1, 1999.
- 8.
The regional classification employed in this article is based on the COW (the Correlates of War Project) code, which divides the world into ten regions. The COW code allocates a unique identification number to each country, where the digit in the hundred’s place is shared by countries in the same region. As for the Asian region, the countries in the Middle East have unique three-digit COW code in the 600s, and those in the rest of Asia (Central Asia, South Asia, and East Asia) except South East Asia have COW codes in the 700s. Countries in South East Asia are distinguished with codes in the 800s. For example, the COW code allocates 600 to Morocco, 698 to Oman, 700 to Afghanistan, 790 to Nepal, 800 to Thailand, and 860 to East Timor. The abbreviations in Fig. 7.1 of “NAm,” “SAm,” “WE,” “EE,” “WAf,” “EAf,” “ME,” “As,” “SEAs,” and “Oc” stand for “North America (less than 100 on the COW code),” “South America (100s on the COW code),” “Western Europe (200s on the COW code),” “Eastern Europe (300s on the COW code),” “West Africa (400s on the COW code),” “East Africa (500s on the COW code),” “Middle East (600s on the COW code),” “Asia (700s on the COW code),” “South East Asia (800s on the COW code),” and “Oceania (900s on the COW code),” respectively. Table 7.1 summarizes the COW code.
- 9.
The ratification list shows that more than half of the countries in the Middle East (North Africa and West Asia) and in Asia (Central Asia, South Asia, and East Asia) have not ratified the treaty. The same list shows that countries in South East Asia are more open to ratification.
- 10.
- 11.
Historically mine fields have been used to protect borders as a cost-effective solution to shortages of soldiers. At the first review conference of the 1980 CCW, China, India, Pakistan, and Russia would not even consider a total ban on anti-personnel mines because they were considered such a critical element of border defense. Efaw (1999). See also Matheson (1997: 159), Rutherford (2001: 90).
- 12.
Maslen (2004: 214–242).
- 13.
Lachowski (1997: 500).
- 14.
This variable is composed of two variables in two different datasets. The first dataset is the Dyadic Direct Contiguity Data Ver. 3 (http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2 Data/DirectContiguity/DCV3desc.htm), which provides information of the bordering neighbors for each country. The second dataset is the Crisis-Density Rivalries (http://www.icbnet.org/Data/index.html), which provides the frequency of conflicts, if any, for any given dyad from 1 (isolated rivalry), 2 (proto rivalry), through 3 (enduring rivalry). The new variable represents the amount of the external threats for a country, which is produced by simple additions of the figures for the direct neighbors and the ongoing conflicts exclusively.
- 15.
This variable is based on the POLITY score, which ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to –10 (strongly autocratic), in the dataset of “Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800–2013” (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html).
- 16.
This is the case if we accept the similarity of the preferences among the countries in the same region.
- 17.
Krasner (1991) points out that the formation of international institutions entails distributional conflicts.
- 18.
Canada had prior experience in organizing an international conference similar to the Ottawa Process. The Open Skies conference held in Ottawa in 1990 brought together an ad hoc collection of negotiating parties who deliberated outside of the traditional forum for negotiation, according to an unusual short timetable. See Cameron et al. (1998: 203–204).
- 19.
Canada made an unremarkable proposal in April 1996 to host a small international meeting of officials and NGOs to develop an action plan on landmines. In May 1996, US President Bill Clinton announced American support for the effort to conclude an international agreement to ban landmines. The October meeting in Ottawa happened to be “the only show in the town” after the unsuccessful conclusion of the CCW review conference. Then in the Ottawa meeting Canadian officials found a broad international coalition and an opportunity for Canada to secure its leadership role on this issue. If the Canadians hesitated to assume the leadership, it is widely believed that the Belgians would have taken the lead. See Cameron et al. (1998: 195–197, 202–203).
- 20.
Foreign Minister Ouellet stated in November 1995 that Canada should take the lead in the ban campaign and declare a total ban on anti-personal mines. Ouellet’s awareness of the mine issue came from his ministerial responsibility for Canadian development assistantship, some of which was allocated for demining operations in mine-affected regions around the world. In January 1996, just after Ouellet retired, the new Foreign Minister Axworthy made a decision to make the landmine issue a priority of Canadian foreign policy. Ouellet’s senior policy adviser, who stayed in the same position after Ouellet’s retirement, provided the necessary continuity on the landmines policy. See Cameron et al. (1998: 54, 191, 194).
- 21.
Referring to East Asia, Morrison (2001: 1) observed that “[T]he countries of the region have not been major actors in shaping the institutions and rules of the international system. They often lack the weight and status in international organizations they should have based on population or economic size.”
- 22.
- 23.
- 24.
Maslen (2006: 65).
- 25.
- 26.
- 27.
King et al. (1994).
- 28.
Rutherford (2000: 106).
- 29.
- 30.
Jupille (1999).
- 31.
- 32.
The notations are employed from Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: 104).
- 33.
It was virtually impossible to amend the pro-ban states’ proposal because the voting rule required a two-thirds majority and the self-selection principle denied skeptics voting rights. In order to participate as a full member in the ban treaty negotiations in Oslo in September 1997, states had to sign the Brussels Declaration endorsing the Austrian draft as the basis for treaty negotiations. After the approximately 70 states had submitted comments, the Austrian draft, which circulated worldwide on 13 May 1997, already had acquired enough legitimacy to deter or overrule the skeptics’ challenge. See Cameron, Lawson, and Tomlin (1998: 230, 295).
- 34.
Milner (1997: 264).
- 35.
Banks (1990).
- 36.
Banks (1993).
- 37.
Denzau and Mackay (1983).
- 38.
The discriminant of this quadratic equation is non-negative under any condition.
- 39.
Sigal (2006: 193).
- 40.
- 41.
Velin (1997) observed the power of African cohesion in the Ottawa process as follows: “The African States participating fully in the negotiations – about one third of the number of countries participating – dug in their heels to ensure the treaty text would set an unambiguous, immediate ban on anti-personnel mines. The African group contains some of the world’s most badly affected countries, including Mozambique and Angola. African cohesion mattered in particular as together the States formed a sufficiently large block to ensure concessions to the United States could not win two-thirds majority support.”
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Hayashi, H. (2017). An Agenda-Setting Game of the Landmine Ban Treaty. In: Suzuki, M., Okada, A. (eds) Games of Conflict and Cooperation in Asia. The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-56466-9_7
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