Abstract
This chapter investigates the effect of capital accumulation on partial privatization. We extend the dynamic oligopoly model proposed by Cellini and Lambertini in 1998 to a dynamic mixed oligopoly model. We show that (i) when a steady state is characterized by a demand-driven (i.e., static) equilibrium, partial privatization is adopted and the privatization ratio perfectly corresponds to the static model; (ii) when a public firm produces Ramsey output, the level of social welfare in a steady state does not depend on the privatization ratio; and (iii) when a private firm produces Ramsey output, the government adopts a full nationalization policy. The results of (ii) and (iii) are in contrast with the static result that partial privatization is optimal.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 A.4.1 Derivation of the Reaction Function of Private Firms
From (4.5), the optimal reaction function, \( {q}_{1,t}^r \), becomes
Differentiating (A4.1) with respect to time, we obtain \( \frac{d{q}_{1,t}^r}{dt}=-\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{d{q}_{0,t}^r}{dt}+\frac{d{\lambda}_{1,t}}{dt}\right) \).
Substituting (4.6) into this, we obtain \( \frac{d{q}_{1,t}^r}{dt}=-\frac{1}{2}\left\{\frac{d{q}_{0,t}^r}{dt}+{\lambda}_{1,t}\left[\delta +\rho -{f}^{\prime}\left({k}_{1,t}\right)\right]\right\} \). Using \( {\lambda}_{1,t}=a-{q}_{0,t}^r-2{q}_{1,t}^r-{c}_0 \), we obtain (4.7).
1.2 A.4.2 Derivation of the Reaction Function of the Public Firm
From (4.8), an optimal reaction function becomes
Differentiating (A4.2) with respect to time, we obtain \( \frac{d{q}_{0,t}^r}{dt}=-\frac{1}{1+\theta}\left(\frac{d{q}_{1,t}^r}{dt}+\frac{d{\lambda}_{0,t}}{dt}\right) \). Substituting (4.9) into this, we obtain \( \frac{d{q}_{0,t}^r}{dt}=-\frac{1}{1+\theta}\left\{\frac{d{q}_{1,t}^r}{dt}+{\lambda}_{0,t}\left[\delta +\rho -{f}^{\prime}\left({k}_{0,t}\right)\right]\right\} \). Using \( {\lambda}_{1,t}=a-\left(1+\theta \right){q}_{0,t}^r-{q}_{1,t}^r-{c}_0 \), we obtain (4.10).
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Shinozaki, T., Kato, H., Yanagihara, M. (2017). Physical Capital Accumulation and Partial Privatization. In: Yanagihara, M., Kunizaki, M. (eds) The Theory of Mixed Oligopoly. New Frontiers in Regional Science: Asian Perspectives, vol 14. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55633-6_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55633-6_4
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