New Mechanism for Matching Service in Perishable Goods Trade: An Approach Using Economic Experiments

  • Kenju Akai
  • Kengo Hayashida
  • Nariaki Nishino


This chapter evaluates a new mechanism for matching service in perishable goods by using the experimental economics method. This new mechanism employs a double-sided auction mechanism, in which buyers and sellers bid on both prices and date to trade. When compared to another type of double-sided auction mechanism, called the time criticality-based mechanism, this new mechanism achieves more truthful bidding of a date to trade and trading prices that are closer to the market equilibrium prices. However, the new mechanism is less efficient economically because there are fewer transactions.


Economic experiment Mechanism design Perishable goods 


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Copyright information

© Springer Japan 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of TokyoTokyoJapan
  2. 2.Tokyo Institute of TechnologyTokyoJapan

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