Abstract
This chapter argues that the collective action in Asia by its regional organizations has historically suffered from a “capability–legitimacy gap”: a disjuncture between the capability (in terms of material resources) of major Asian powers to lead regional cooperation on the one hand and their political legitimacy and will as regional leaders on the other. Successful collective action requires leadership with both capability (as suggested by rationalist theories) and legitimacy (as suggested by constructivist approaches). A central point of the chapter is that the putative or aspiring leaders of Asian regionalism throughout the post-war period never had both. Actors who were materially capable of providing leadership and direction (the United States [US] and Japan) lacked the necessary legitimacy, while those who possessed legitimacy (India and the People’s Republic of China [PRC]) in the 1940s and 1950s, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 1967, and Indonesia (in the context of Asia as a whole) have lacked the necessary resources. (Although the US is not an Asian country, it can be regarded as a resident Asian power and a player in Asian regionalism. The PRC was known as China before 1949). The result has been that while the ASEAN-led Asian institutions have made a significant normative contribution to regional order, they have not proved to be effective instruments of regional problem solving. But the capability–legitimacy gap has both costs and benefits. While Asian regional institutions remain weakly institutionalized and attract criticism as “talk-shops,” they have helped to ensure that Asia does not degenerate into a hegemonic order or a concert of power. It remains to be seen whether regionalism in an era of a rising PRC and India could bridge this gap. It is theoretically possible that the PRC and India could develop and possess both the resources and political will and standing to provide collective goods and lead Asian regionalism, but their mutual rivalry might prevent this.
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Notes
- 1.
Olson considers normative or “moral incentives” behind collective action, but dismisses them as “selective incentives.” Olson (1965), p. 61 (footnote 17).
- 2.
Ceylon was renamed Sri Lanka in 1972. Burma became known as Myanmar in 1989.
- 3.
- 4.
According to the Pentagon Papers, “In the event of a massive Chinese troop intervention…it is quite possible that the US would have retaliated with strategic nuclear weapons against targets in China” (Buszynski 1983).
- 5.
In a way, these two short-lived experiments in Southeast Asian regionalism—ASA and MAPHILINDO—showed the importance of regional legitimacy on the part of Indonesia, the main regional actor.
- 6.
“Golden cage” is a metaphor to describe Indonesia’s predicament in being recognized as the de facto leader of ASEAN in exchange for not accepting a commitment to exercise restraint toward its smaller neighbors and not to threaten or coerce them.
- 7.
Nonofficial meetings in which government officials may participate in their private capacity.
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Acharya, A. (2014). Foundations of Collective Action in Asia: Theory and Practice of Regional Cooperation. In: Capannelli, G., Kawai, M. (eds) The Political Economy of Asian Regionalism. Springer, Tokyo. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54568-2_2
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