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Abstract

The issue of the effectiveness of open competition for foreign direct investment is generally overshadowed by the much larger question about the impact of FDI on economic growth and development. On the positive side, FDI has the potential to bring employment, capital, technology and knowledge to a country. It can also increase income, foreign exchange, and stimulate domestic investment. Moreover, so called spill-over effects can raise productivity of local firms, lower the cost of R&D and innovation, stimulate the establishment of local supplier networks, and generally facilitate an increased integration in global markets. On the negative side, FDI is associated with the risk of lowered domestic savings and investment, the crowding-out of local firms in capital markets, distorted competition, diminished regulatory standards, and the absence of expected spillover effects.

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References

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  35. When aggregating potential economic and political costs of FDI competition, its impact on the general welfare of host countries appears even more ambiguous. The notion that there is not just one efficient outcome, but varying sets of arrangements that could loosely be defined as efficient (GARRETT, 1992), comes to mind. The latter is particularly advocated in the realist tradition of regime theory in political sciences, which states that “The problem is not how to get to the Pareto frontier but which point along the frontier will be chosen.” (KRASNER, 1992, p. 340). A similar view is also favored in some NIE quarters, which argue that system competition entails both economic competition for mobile factors between jurisdictions as well as political competition for votes within the jurisdiction, and that the latter renders the idea of one efficient outcome based on (economic) system competition obsolete (see WOHLGEMUTH/ ADAMOVICH, 1999). The political economy of FDI competition, which is presented in Chapter 5, will follow-up on this line of argument in general, and the impact of distributional conflicts and power asymmetries in the process, in particular.

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© 2006 Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag | GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden

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(2006). Evaluating the Overall Effectiveness of FDI Competition. In: Locational Tournaments in the Context of the EU Competitive Environment. DUV. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8350-9109-2_10

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