Abstract
Many theoretical analyses argue that the involvement of large shareholders in monitoring or control activities has the potential to limit agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Maug (1998), and Noe (2002)). Empirical support for this argument has been provided by a number of studies (e.g. Agrawal and Mandelker (1990), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Holderness (2003)). Results are, however, still ambiguous.
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© 2010 Gabler Verlag | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH
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Drees, F. (2010). New Outside Blockholders, Performance, and Governance in Germany. In: Motives for and Consequences of Minority Equity Purchases. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8886-7_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8886-7_2
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