Abstract
The chapter analyzes the structure of executive pay in family and non-family firms. It is connected to the overall research question of long-term orientation in family firms in that incentive pay is regarded as a source of myopic managerial behavior. If family firms indeed pursue more longterm goals, this should be reflected in the structure of executive pay. Accordingly, there should be a low share of short-term incentive pay and a high proportion of base salary in total pay.
This chapter is based on Block (2008b). The paper was presented at the TIME Kolloquium, which is jointly organized by Technische Universität München and Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.
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© 2009 Gabler | GWV Fachverlage GmbH
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Block, J. (2009). Family firms and executive pay. In: Long-term Orientation of Family Firms. Gabler. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8412-8_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8412-8_8
Publisher Name: Gabler
Print ISBN: 978-3-8349-1959-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-8349-8412-8
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