Abstract
There is a growing consensus that climate change has the potential to seriously damage our natural environment and affect the global economy, thus representing the world’s most pressing long-term threat to future prosperity and security. With greenhouse gas emissions embodied in virtually all products produced and traded in every conceivable economic sector, effectively addressing climate change will require a fundamental transformation of our economy and the ways that energy is produced and used. This will certainly have a bearing on world trade as it will affect the cost of production of traded products and therefore their competitive positions in the world market. This climate-trade nexus has become the focus of an academic debate (e.g., Bhagwati and Mavroidis 2007; Charnovitz 2003; Ismer and Neuhoff 2007; Swedish National Board of Trade 2004; The World Bank 2007; Zhang 1998, 2004, 2007a; Zhang and Assunção 2004), and gains increasing attention as governments are taking great efforts to implement the Kyoto Protocol and forge a post-2012 climate change regime to succeed it.
A similar version of this chapter has been previously published in International Economics and Economic Policy, Special Issue on “International Economics of Resources and Resource Policy”, Volume 7, Numbers 2–3/August 2010.
This chapter is built on the keynote address on Encouraging Developing Country Involvement in a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime: Carrots, Sticks or Both? at the Conference on Designing International Climate Change Mitigation Policies through RD&D Strategic Cooperation, Catholic University Leuven, Belgium, 12 October 2009; the invited presentation on Multilateral Trade Measures in a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime?: What Can Be Taken from the Montreal Protocol and the WTO? both at the International Workshop on Post-2012 Climate and Trade Policies, the United Nations Environment Programme, Geneva, 8–9 September 2008 and at Shanghai Forum 2009: Crisis, Cooperation and Development, Shanghai, 11–12 May 2009; the invited presentation on Climate Change Meets Trade in Promoting Green Growth: Potential Conflicts and Synergies at the East-West Center/Korea Development Institute Conference on Climate Change and Green Growth: Korea’s National Growth Strategy, Honolulu, Hawaii, 23–24 July 2009; the invited presentation on NAMAs, Unilateral Actions, Registry, Carbon Credits, MRV and Long-term Low-carbon Strategy at International Workshop on Envisaging a New Climate Change Agreement in Copenhagen, Seoul, 13 November 2009; and the invited panel discussion on Green Growth, Climate Change and WTO at the Korea International Trade Association/Peterson Institute for International Economics International Conference on the New Global Trading System in the Post-Crisis Era, Seoul, 7 December 2009. It has benefited from useful discussions with the participants in these meetings. That said, the views expressed here are those of the author. The author bears sole responsibility for any errors and omissions that may remain.
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- 1.
See Reinaud (2008) for an excellent review of practical issues involved in implementing unilateral EAR.
- 2.
H.R. 2998, available at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname111_cong_billsamp;docidf:h2998ih.txt.pdf.
- 3.
This is in line with the IBEW/AEP proposal, which requires US importers to submit allowances to cover the emissions produced during the manufacturing of those goods 2 years after USA starts its cap-and-trade program (McBroom 2008).
- 4.
To be consistent with the WTO provisions, foreign producers could arguably demand the same proportion of free allowances as US domestic producers in case they are subject to border carbon adjustments.
- 5.
In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortionary taxes, if allowances are auctioned, the revenues generated can then be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes, thus generating overall efficiency gains. Parry et al. (1999), for example, show that the costs of reducing US carbon emissions by 10% in a second-best setting with pre-existing labor taxes are five times more costly under a grandfathered carbon permits case than under an auctioned case. This is because the policy where the permits are auctioned raises revenues for the government that can be used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes. By contrast, in the former case, no revenue-recycling effect occurs, since no revenues are raised for the government. However, the policy produces the same tax-interaction effect as under the latter case, which tends to reduce employment and investment and thus exacerbates the distortionary effects of pre-existing taxes (Zhang 1999).
- 6.
As part of its comprehensive strategy to control CO2 emissions and increase energy efficiency, a carbon/energy tax has been proposed by the CEC. The CEC proposal is that member states introduce a carbon/energy tax of US$ 3 per barrel oil equivalent in 1993, rising in real terms by US$ 1 a year to US$ 10 per barrel in 2000. After the year 2000 the tax rate will remain at US$ 10 per barrel at 1993 prices. The tax rates are allocated across fuels, with 50% based on carbon content and 50% on energy content (Zhang 1997).
- 7.
See Genasci (2008) for discussion on complicating issues related to how to rebate exports under a cap-and-trade regime.
- 8.
President Obama was quoted as saying that “At a time when the economy worldwide is still deep in recession and we’ve seen a significant drop in global trade, I think we have to be very careful about sending any protectionist signals out there. I think there may be other ways of doing it than with a tariff approach” (Broder 2009).
- 9.
UNDESA (2009) projects that China’s population would peak at 1,462.5 millions around 2030, while India’s population would be projected to be at 1,484.6 millions in 2030 and further grow to 1,613.8 millions in 2050.
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Zhang, Z. (2011). The US Proposed Carbon Tariffs, WTO Scrutiny and China’s Responses. In: Bleischwitz, R., Welfens, P., Zhang, Z. (eds) International Economics of Resource Efficiency. Physica-Verlag HD. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7908-2601-2_7
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